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Equal Protection and the Idea of Equality
R. George Wright
Introduction
Few subjects are more central to contemporary constitutional
law than the equal protection of the laws.1 As well, few subjects
are more central to legal, political, social, and ethical philosophy
than the idea of equality itself.' Undeniably, the crucial term
''equal" in the context of the equal protection of the laws must bear
some significant relation to some central meaning of the idea of
equality. There must be a linkage, of whatever sort, between the
equal protection of the laws and the idea of equality itself.
Oddly, though, the most crucial Supreme Court discussions
on equal protection bear only modest indication, either direct or
indirect, explicit or implicit, and however diluted, of any of the
leading historic, traditional, or contemporary understandings of
the idea of equality itself.' This odd state of affairs calls for some
explanation, if not also for a remedy.
The problem is thus not that the Court adopts, if only
implicitly, some historic or traditional understanding of the idea of
equality, as opposed to any of the leading contemporary theories of
equality. That practice would raise only standard questions of the
proper methods of constitutional interpretation, including the role
of originalism.
t. Lawrence A. Jegen III Professor of Law, Indiana University Robert H.
McKinney School of Law.
1. See infra Part I.
2. See infra Parts II, III, IV, V, VI. This is not necessarily to equate any form
of equality with justice. Until we adopt some theory to the contrary, some forms of
inequality may be just and some equalities may be unjust. See Shlomi Segall, Why
Egalitarians Should Not Care About Equality, 15 ETHICAL THEORY & MORAL PRAC.
507, 508 (2012). Nor will the various conflicting forms and measures of equality
sort themselves out without some further principle. See S.I. BENN & R.S. PETERS,
THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 132 (1959).
3. See infra Part I; see also Christopher J. Peters, Foolish Consistency: On
Equality, Integrity, and Justice in Stare Decisis, 105 YALE L.J. 2031 (1996) (arguing
that the courts should forego strict adherence to stare decisis if reliance on
outdated principles of previous cases would fail to do justice in the cases before
them).
4. For contemporary discussions of one or more forms of originalism in
constitutional adjudication, see, for example, JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM
(2011); ROBERT W. BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL
Law and Inequality
The problem is instead deeper. The focus is not on a struggle
between historic and contemporary meanings of equality. The
focus is instead on the fact that the Court seems uninterested in-
and is typically uninfluenced, even indirectly, by-any prominent
understandings of the meaning and the normative implications of
the idea of equality. It is thus not that the Court typically relies
on what some would consider an obsolete, unjustified, or otherwise
defective theory of the idea of equality.5 It is rather that the Court
does not rely, even implicitly, on any coherent broader
understanding of equality.
This does not mean that the Court's equal protection
discussions cannot be creatively tied, at points, to one or more
coherent understandings of equality. A number of these more or
less implicit, fragmentary, unsustained, or ambiguous linkages are
discussed below.6 Realistically, it would be impossible for the
Court to discuss equal protection without borrowing any of the
terms, concepts, and categories in which the idea of equality is
more widely discussed. The problem is that the Court, across
cases and within individual cases, neither develops nor genuinely
relies upon any consistent general understanding of the
descriptive and normative meaning of equality. To this extent,
crucially, the Court's equal protection case outcomes and opinions
do not benefit from available understandings of equality.
On occasion, what the Court says can indeed be classified as
falling within one or more broad theories of equality. But,
especially of late, most of the Court's attention in equal protection
cases is focused instead on first fitting the case into some sort of
judicial framework, typology, or scale; then on discerning the
appropriate judicial test to be applied; and finally on determining
whether the classification at issue passes or fails that judicial
test.7 Adopting, defending, and applying broad elements of a
coherent, descriptive, and normative understanding of the
underlying idea of equality itself are not commonly on the Court's
agenda.
ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE (2011); JOHN 0. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT,
ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD CONSTITUTION (2013); ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-
CENTURY OF DEBATE (Steven G. Calabresi ed., 2007).
5. Cf. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT,
INTEREST, AND MONEY 383-84 (Harcourt, Brace & World 1965) (1936) (discussing
the dependence of civil servants, politicians, and agitators on earlier academics and
their theories upon the influence of "some academic scribbler of a few years back").
6. See infra Part I.
7. See infra Part I.
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This typical judicial neglect of articulated theories of equality
results in judicial opinions that beg important questions, or that
leave important arguments addressed unconvincingly, or not at
all. Judicial opinions on equal protection can thus to a degree
seem insular, formulaic, merely institutional, conventionalized,
and ultimately arbitrary-not fully responsive to our underlying
jurisprudential concerns. In this way, the power, authority, and
legitimacy of the Court's equal protection jurisprudence will
eventually suffer.
Below, this Article documents this important phenomenon,
and offers a partial diagnosis, along with a positive
recommendation that in turn carries its own tragic limitations.
This Article first surveys a number of important and
representative Supreme Court equal protection cases that
cumulatively illustrate the lack of meaningful, consistent, genuine
reliance by the Court on any coherent descriptive or normative
theory of equality.8  This Article then suggests a possible
explanation for this important disconnect between equal
protection jurisprudence and any systematic approach to equality
itself: that the sheer proliferating variety and complexity of
plausible approaches to the idea of equality9 make general judicial
reliance on any approach increasingly difficult and increasingly
intellectually irresponsible.10 Judicially adopting any approach to
the idea of equality is an understandably intimidating prospect.
Only a few of the major complications involved in judicially
endorsing a theory of equality, or of any broad segment thereof,
can be mentioned in any limited space. This Article refers first to
the riotous disorder around the question of sufficient underlying
grounds, bases, or justifications for judging or treating persons
equally.11 It then presents several of the distinct typologies of
8. See infra Part I. By way of a very rough comparative benchmark in the
area of liberty, the Supreme Court has used the specific term "paternalism" or
"paternalistic" in the same paragraph as the word "speech" in thirteen cases. I
used the (disjunctive) query: "paternalistic" or "paternalism" in the same
paragraph as "speech" in the Supreme Court database. At the time, this Westlaw
search generated thirteen results, which seemed to me to indicate at least some
level of Supreme Court awareness of some such issue or issues in that parallel
context. Search of the Westlaw Supreme Court database as of June 20, 2015.
9. See JORGE LUis BORGES, THE LIBRARY OF BABEL, in COLLECTED FICTIONS
112, 112-18 (Andrew Hurley trans., Viking Penguin 1998) (1944) (discussing some
of the costs and complications of expanding alternatives of equality).
10. For a sense of some of the proliferating complications, see infra Parts II, III,
IV, V, V.
11. See infra Part II.
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egalitarian theories, where each typology contributes to the
proliferating available options with no evident simplification or
resolution.12
As it turns out, at one level of particularity or another, the
roles of various forms of luck; of responsibility and proximate
cause; of free will and determinism; and of forgiveness,
bankruptcy, and insurance are often thought to bear importantly
on choices among egalitarian theories.1 3  But these matters
themselves have each reached levels of hopeless complexity,
1 4
further limiting their judicial appeal in the context of equal
protection.
This Article then introduces several contending basic families
of approaches to the idea of equality, including relatively strict or
demanding approaches to distributional equality," along with
what are more technically known as prioritarianism and
sufficientarianism,"7 each in their various forms. The question of
what counts as a theory of equality is also very briefly raised in
the contexts of utilitarian schools of thought," theories focusing on
the concept of needs, 9 theories focusing on what persons are said
to deserve," and theories focusing less centrally on distributional
matters and more on patterns of dominance and oppression."
All of these unresolved complications, along with others not
referenced herein, should account for the reluctance on the part of
the courts to broadly endorse any particular understanding of
equality. But this means that the courts are denying their equal-
protection judgments and opinions the persuasiveness, cogency,
consistency, legitimacy, and authority that can be derived from a
coherent underlying view of what equality itself implies. This is a
high price to pay.
12. See infra Part III.
13. See infra Part IV.
14. See infra Part IV. For more detailed discussion of some of the complications
of free will, responsibility, and determinism, see R. George Wright, Criminal Law
and Sentencing: What Goes With Free Will?, 5 DREXEL L. REV. 1 (2012) [hereinafter
Wright, Criminal Law and Sentencing].
15. See infra Part V.
16. See infra Part V.
17. See infra Part V.
18. See infra note 211 and accompanying text.
19. See infra note 141 and accompanying text.
20. See infra note 141 and accompanying text. For a discussion of free will and
responsibility, see infra Part IV.
21. See infra note 152 and accompanying text.
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Is it possible, though, to cut through the various intimidating
complications and seize upon some attractive, easily
understandable, and related concept that could help guide and
justify equal protection decision-making? In its conclusion, this
Article suggests that the best available such candidate, overall,
might be the family of ideas encompassing notions such as
community, solidarity, fellow-feeling, extended sympathy, and
fraternity, all expanded to encompass at least the members of the
relevant geographical unit.22 A substantial obstacle to adopting
such an approach, however, is the historical and constitutional
strength of individualist and libertarian objections.2 3  Even
indirectly, any general constitutional reliance on a conception of
community, in elaborating the idea of equality, would cut against
the grain of the Constitution's unfortunate, almost complete lack
of weighty communitarian elements. 4
On that basis, this Article now takes up the Equal Protection
Clause's typically fitful relationships with anything like a coherent
theory of equality.
I. What Does Equal Protection Law Say to Us About
Equality?
It would be odd if the law of equal protection bore absolutely
no relationship to any of the major contending approaches to the
idea of equality itself. This is not to suggest that judges deciding
equal protection cases typically, consciously attend to any theory
of equality. Perhaps the courts instead absorb limited elements of
equality theories in an indirect, inexplicit way. The process may
be akin to that implied by John Maynard Keynes's reference to
practical decision-makers-civil servants, politicians, and
agitators-who are unknowingly influenced by "some academic
scribbler of a few years back. 2'  As we shall eventually see,
however, relationships between the dominant law of equal
protection and the most respected theories of equality itself are
typically murky and limited, where they do not actually conflict.
2 6
22. See infra Part VI.
23. See infra Part VI.
24. See infra Part VI. For a more detailed discussion, see R. George Wright,
Homelessness and the Missing Constitutional Dimension of Fraternity, 46 U.
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 437 (2007) [hereinafter Wright, Homelessness].
25. KEYNES, supra note 5, at 383.
26. See infra Parts 11, III, IV, V, VI.
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The text of the Fourteenth Amendment relies upon, but does
not tell us much about, any intended meanings of the idea of
equality.27 Fourteenth Amendment equality must logically be
susceptible to being legally protected or denied,28 but it is equally
obvious that we have no textual guidance as to any relevant forms
of protection and denial. 9
The Equal Protection Clause can, to begin with, be
interpreted in what we might call a narrow, minimalist,
formalistic way. 3 Thus the Supreme Court has declared that the
Equal Protection Clause "announces a fundamental principle: the
State must govern impartially. General rules that apply
evenhandedly to all persons within the jurisdiction unquestionably
comply with this principle. 31  This formula leaves open the
breadth of possible remedies when equal governance, in the sense
of impartial or evenhanded governance, has been denied. But it
does appear to rule out the possibility that impartial and
evenhanded governance, in the relevant sense, could ever give rise
to an equal protection violation.
How the courts then define "impartial" and "evenhanded"
governance in turn reflects the breadth or narrowness 4 of the
state responsibility35 that is recognized under what is known as
the state action doctrine.3 6  The narrower (or the broader) the
scope of the unequal social and economic circumstances for which
27. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I ("No State shall ... deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."); see infra Part 11.
28. See infra Part 11.
29. See infra Part II.
30. See, e.g., CASE R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON
THE SUPREME COURT 9-10 (1999) (discussing the composition of the current Court
and classifying the justices as "minimalist" or "maximalist").
31. N.Y.C. Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 (1979). On the other
hand, rules inevitably classify, thereby creating at least two possible classes.
32. See id.
33. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948) (opting for a relatively
broad view of what constitutes a "state action" for which the state may bear
responsibility under the Fourteenth Amendment).
34. See, e.g., Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756 (2005) (opting
for a relatively narrow view of state responsibility); DeShaney v. Winnebago Dep't
of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 187, 196 (1989) (same).
35. See R. George Wright, State Action and State Responsibility, 23 SUFFOLK U.
L. REV. 685 (1989) [hereinafter Wright, State Action].
36. For instructive cases on the scope of state action and of state responsibility
under the Fourteenth Amendment, see, for example, Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co.,
419 U.S. 345, 351-53 (1974); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715,
721-22 (1961). Typically, the presence of state action parallels the 42. U.S.C.
§ 1983 requirement of action under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487
U.S. 42, 49 (1988).
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the state is considered to bear at least partial responsibility, the
narrower (or the broader) the corresponding scope of
circumstances in which a government may be said to have violated
the impartial and evenhanded governance requirement.3 7 Whether
explicitly or not, the courts must inescapably take some stand on,
say, whether unequal distributions of income and wealth reflect
state action and thus raise a possible equal protection issue.38 The
proper scope of governmental and personal responsibility remains
controversial. 9
One alternative but no less murky formulation states that
"the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of
equal laws."4 If "equal laws" can indeed mask and legitimize gross
social and economic inequalities, this formulation seems to lend
itself to undue manipulation. Ironically, the very case endorsing
this potentially formalistic language, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, is best
known for an element of realism.41 Yick Wo realistically and
insightfully authorizes, at least in extreme cases, not only the
consideration of the text of a rule, or of the enactors' intent, but of
the gross disparities and objectionable intent in the
implementation and administration of a facially impartial rule.
4 2
37. See West, 487 U.S. at 49; Jackson, 419 U.S. at 351-53; Burton, 365 U.S. at
721-22.
38. For broad policy discussions on wealth and income inequality, see, for
example, JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE GREAT DIVIDE: UNEQUAL SOCIETIES AND WHAT
WE CAN Do ABOUT THEM (2015) [hereinafter STIGLITZ, THE GREAT DIVIDE]; JOSEPH
E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY: HOW TODAY'S DIVIDED SOCIETY ENDANGERS
OUR FUTURE (2013). For discussions of generational inequalities, see ED HOWKER
& SHIV MALIK, JILTED GENERATION (2010); DAVID WILLETTS, THE PINCH (2011).
39. See, e.g., LARRY MAY, SHARING RESPONSIBILITY (1992) (arguing that
individuals share responsibility for harms in their communities); PERSPECTIVES ON
MORAL RESPONSIBILITY (John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza eds., 1994)
(providing an exceptionally useful collection of views on the scope of governmental
and personal responsibility); see also R.A. DUFF, ANSWERING FOR CRIME:
RESPONSIBILITY AND LIABILITY IN THE CRIMINAL LAW (2007) (examining
responsibility in the context of criminal law); MICHAEL S. MOORE, CAUSATION AND
RESPONSIBILITY (2009) (analyzing "causation" as a central element of
responsibility). But see BRUCE N. WALLER, AGAINST MORAL RESPONSIBILITY (2011)
(presenting a distinctively skeptical approach to standard views). For an overview
of some of these basic controversies, see Wright, Criminal Law and Sentencing,
supra note 14.
40. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
41. See Yick Wo, 118 U.S. 356.
42. See id. at 373-74; see also Allen v. City of Sacramento, 183 Cal. Rptr. 3d
654, 673 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015) ("Even when a law is nondiscriminatory on its face,
equal protection is violated if the law is applied in a manner that discriminates
against a particular group.").
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The requirement of "equal laws ' 43 has been qualified as
requiring not that all persons be classified, judged, or treated
alike, but merely that relevantly similar persons, or persons in
relevantly similar circumstances, be treated alike.44 Persons who
are considered "unlike," or not similarly situated, thus need not be
treated alike.45 At least the initial judgments as to who counts as
relevantly similar, or dissimilar, rests with legislators.46
The basic idea of treating like cases alike, and unlike cases
unlike, has a distinguished pedigree.4 7 Whether justice precisely
requires such a universal principle has been doubted. 4 But even if
we assume the applicability of such a principle in equal protection
cases, the principle in itself provides little useful guidance. 49 It
simply requires the production of some reason for treating any
group less favorably than any other group, with no further
guidance as to what should count as a sufficient reason for any
form or degree of inequality.0
In theory, the reason presented in order to justify unequal
treatment could be subjected to demanding, rigorous judicial
scrutiny on the merits. But the courts often decline to impose such
scrutiny, even with regard to matters of obvious practical
43. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 369.
44. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982); F.S. Royster Guano Co. v.
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920); see also Allen, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 672 (citing City
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)) ("Equal
protection under the federal and California Constitutions requires equal treatment
of persons similarly situated.").
45. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216; Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940) ("The
Constitution does not require things which are different in fact or opinion to be
treated in law as though they were the same.").
46. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216.
47. See ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 84-86 (David Ross trans.,
Oxford Univ. Press 2009) (c. 350 B.C.E.); ARISTOTLE, POLITICS BOOK III (c. 350
B.C.E.), reprinted in THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE 116-18, 127-32 (Ernest Barker
ed., 1962).
48. See, e.g., Norman C. Gillespie, On Treating Like Cases Differently, 25 PHIL.
Q. 151 (1975) (arguing that there is a moral, logical, and reasonable basis for
treating like cases differently); David A. Strauss, Must Like Cases Be Treated
Alike? 2 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Grp.,
Paper No. 24, 2002) ("The principle 'treat like cases alike' has no independent
moral force.").
49. See George P. Fletcher, In God's Image: The Religious Imperative of
Equality Under Law, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1608, 1609-10 (1999). The limitations of
such a principle have been debated. See Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality,
95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982). Contra Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Equality: A
Reply to Professor Westen, 81 MICH. L. REV. 575 (1983); Kent Greenawalt, How
Empty Is the Idea of Equality?, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1167 (1983).
50. Westen, supra note 49, at 559-69.
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importance. 1 Consider, for example, the test applied by the Court
in Plyler v. Doe with regard to the public school educational
opportunities of undocumented alien children: "If the State is to
deny a discrete group of innocent children the free public
education that it offers to other children residing within its
borders, that denial must be justified by a showing that it furthers
some substantial state interest.
5 2
There is much that could be said about both the alienage 3
and the education-oriented 4 aspects of this equal protection
principle. For present purposes, though, the point is to notice the
weak, undemanding character of the substantial state interest
test. Suppose, as a thought experiment, that most of us agreed
that undocumented alien children should be allowed access to
schools or to any other comparable opportunity as a matter of
moral right, moral duty, justice, equality, human rights, dignity,
or on any other grounds. But suppose also that, for whatever
reason-perhaps merely from weakness, or corruption, or failure
of nerve-we then adopt a statute denying the opportunity in
question. What judicial tests would be applied in such a case?
Under Plyler, the equal protection constitutionality of the
statute would depend, crucially, not on our assumed consensus as
to what justice requires or on our subjective motivations in
adopting the statute. Instead, the crucial consideration would be
whether denying the opportunity would more or less predictably
promote, to one degree or another, any state interest that could
reasonably be viewed as substantial. We live in a world of
51. See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992) (citing Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439-41 (1985)) ("[U]nless a classification warrants
some form of heightened review because it jeopardizes exercise of a fundamental
right or categorizes on the basis of an inherently suspect characteristic, the Equal
Protection Clause requires only that the classification rationally further a
legitimate state interest."); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
52. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982). Of course, a more typical
"legitimate state interest" requirement would be even less demanding.
53. See id. at 230-31 (Marshall, J., concurring); id. at 231-36 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring); id. at 236-41 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 242-54 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 489-90 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring); id. at 490-508 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 508-30 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
54. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 19-24 (1973);
Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 485-87.
55. See supra text accompanying note 52.
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controversial tradeoffs, conflicting interests, and tragic choices. 6
Justice will unavoidably involve substantial costs. There will be
tradeoffs between recognizing the above sorts of rights and
promoting at least one substantial and otherwise legitimate public
interest. The Plyler formulation is thus not particularly protective
of basic equality. At a minimum, some form of rigorous or strict
equal protection scrutiny 7 will be more appropriate for such
genuine basic rights cases. Absent some other grounds for strict
scrutiny, laws in "the area of economics and social welfare,""
whatever their unintended but quite real distributive impact,
receive substantial judicial deference.60
56. For example, consider that effectively combatting climate change is often
assumed to involve substantial financial costs. See Eduardo Porter, Counting the
Cost of Fixing the Future, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/201
3/09/11/business/counting-the-cost-of-fixing-the-future.html? r=0; see also GUIDO
CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978) (examining the scarcities
that make difficult tradeoffs necessary).
57. For current judicial thinking on the meaning of strict equal protection
scrutiny, see Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
58. For the genesis of one strand of such possibilities, see United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
59. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
60. See id. at 485-87. The Court has expressed doubts about the workability of
any contrary rule in cases of unequal burdens or benefits, without more. See
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976) (referring in particular to "tax" and
"welfare" policies that lack any textual reference to suspect classifications, any
intentional discrimination on the basis of a suspect classification, and any violation
of fundamental constitutional rights). At the federal level, education is not
regarded as a constitutional right. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982) (citing
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28-29, 37-39 (1973)).
However, some states have held that their constitutions require, if not
educational equality of opportunity, at least something like a minimal educational
opportunity, or a reasonable approach to such equality. See Conn. Coal. for Justice
v. Rell, 990 A.2d 206, 243-44 (Conn. 2010) (contending that "the right to education
is so basic and fundamental that any infringement of that right must be strictly
scrutinized," but focusing thereafter on "adequacy" and "minimal adequacy" along
several dimensions of educational opportunity (citation omitted)); Gannon v. State,
319 P.3d 1196, 1239 (Kan. 2014) (requiring "reasonably equal access to
substantially similar educational opportunity through similar tax effort" and
holding that "equity need not meet precise equality standards"). But see King v.
State, 818 N.W.2d 1, 32-33 (Iowa 2012) (holding that education is not a
fundamental right under the Iowa constitution).
Aliens, whether documented or undocumented, are persons for equal protection
purposes. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 210; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 368
(1886). However, there is an anomalous and complex history of classifying Native
Americans as "individuals" or as "communities." See, e.g., Nevada v. Hicks, 533
U.S. 353, 360-62 (2001); Cherokee Nation v. State, 30 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1831). For
additional discussion on the judiciary's handling of multiculturalism, see WILL
KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS
(2000); Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM:
EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 25 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1994).
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The idea of official evenhandedness is also central to equal
protection and related issues involving the categories of the well-
off and the poor or otherwise needy. Thus, vagrancy laws61 can be
objected to by courts, not because they tend to stabilize
humiliating class divisions, but because they undermine the
evenhanded application of the law,6 2 and therefore to some degree
the rule of law itself.63 The rule of law, evenhandedly applied to
rich and poor alike, 4 is judicially thought to be a sort of "glue" that
genuinely helps to hold together a society otherwise presumably
fractured by substantial class divisions.6
An egalitarian might well wonder, though, whether the rule
of law's assumed ability to help stabilize an economically divided
society, as distinct from reducing the severity of those economic
divisions, is especially desirable. The rule of law itself is not
typically thought to emphasize substantive economic equality, as
distinct from various sorts of merely formalist or procedural
equality.6
61. See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 156-57 n.1
(1972) (reciting a Jacksonville vagrancy ordinance that criminalized, among others,
"[r]ogues and vagabonds, or dissolute persons who go about begging").
62. See id. at 171 ('Vagrancy laws of the Jacksonville type teach that the scales
of justice are so tipped that even-handed administration of the law is not
possible.").
63. See id.
64. See ANATOLE FRANCE, THE RED LILY 73 (Winifred Stephens trans., 1910)
(1894) (providing a distinctly ironic take on the classic paean to legal
evenhandedness by denying both the rich and the poor any right to sleep under the
bridges).
65. See Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 171 ('The rule of law, evenly applied to
minorities as well as majorities, to the poor as well as the rich, is the great
mucilage that holds society together."); Desertrain v. City of L.A., 754 F.3d 1147,
1157 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Papachristou).
66. For some standard formulations of the idea of the rule of law that reflect
this generalization, see JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 270-71
(Paul Craig ed., 2d ed. 2011); LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33-94 (Yale
Univ. Press rev. ed. 1969); Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in LIBERTY
AND THE RULE OF LAW 3 (Robert L. Cunningham ed., 1979). For an example of a
substantive-human-rights-oriented understanding of the rule of law, see Lord
Bingham, The Rule of Law, 66 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 67-82 (2007). Of particular interest
is the largely formalist or procedurally egalitarian rule of law theory of John Rawls.
See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 235-43 (1971) [hereinafter RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE]; see also Donald H.J. Hermann, The Fallacy of Legal
Procedure as Predominant over Substantive Justice: A Critique of the "Rule of Law"
in John Rawls' A Theory of Justice, 23 DEPAUL U. L. REV. 1408, 1416-17 (1974)
(providing commentary on A THEORY OF JUSTICE).
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It is judicially argued, though, that while equal protection
does not require, for example, subsistence-oriented welfare
benefits;67 such payments "can help bring within the reach of the
poor the same opportunities that are available to others to
participate meaningfully in the life of the community."68
There are three important responses to this argument. First,
it is not clear that subsistence-oriented welfare benefits make the
difference between having a realistic opportunity to meaningfully
participate in the broader community life or not. 9  Second,
whether such a participatory opportunity is widely available or
not, there remains a major gulf between such an opportunity and
any broadly shared sense of genuine solidarity, fraternity, or
communitarianism. 0  Third, subsistence-oriented welfare
payments have little to do with egalitarianism in any reasonably
stringent sense.7 1  It is certainly possible to characterize any
welfare payment of any magnitude as tending to reduce
inequality. But as we shall see,72 modest welfare benefits are best
accounted for theoretically not in terms of any demanding
approach to equality, but in terms of some alternative, less
egalitarian theory.
Consider, for example, the principle endorsed at the state
constitutional level in the New York welfare case of Tucker v.
Toia.3 In Tucker, the court recognized a state constitutional
67. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1970) ("[T]he
Fourteenth Amendment gives the federal courts no power to impose upon the
States their views of what constitutes wise economic or social policy."). Rights at
the state level vary. See, e.g., Daugherty v. Wallace, 621 N.E.2d 1374, 1378 (Ohio
1993) (rejecting a state constitutional right to welfare). But see, e.g., Tucker v.
Toia, 371 N.E.2d 449, 452 (N.Y. 1977) ("[The New York State Constitution]
unequivocally prevents the Legislature from simply refusing to aid those whom it
has classified as needy."). Nor is there any federal constitutional welfare right in
the specific form of minimum-quality housing. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56,
74 (1972).
68. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265 (1970).
69. Compare id. at 265 (advocating that welfare benefits create opportunities
for meaningful community participation), with Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate,
Workfare Versus Welfare: Incentive Arguments for Work Requirements in Poverty-
Alleviation Programs, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 249, 258 (1992) (addressing the argument
that work incentives are necessary to induce welfare-benefit recipients to become
productive members of society).
70. This Article takes up the importance of ideas such as broad social solidarity,
broad community, and fraternity below. See infra Part V. For background on this
topic, see Wright, Homelessness, supra note 24.
71. See infra Part V (comparing and contrasting rigorous egalitarianism with
lesser approaches).
72. See infra Part V (discussing the available-if often judicially unutilized-
approaches known as "prioritarianism" and "sufficientarianism").
73. Tucker v. Toia, 371 N.E.2d 449 (N.Y. 1977).
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"affirmative duty to aid the needy."74 The court understandably
granted discretion to the legislature in defining the term "needy,"
in setting other eligibility requirements, and in specifying benefit
amounts.75 But a legislative refusal to aid any person who the
legislature recognized as "needy" was constitutionally
impermissible.76
Now, there is a sense in which any constitutional
requirement of any non-zero welfare benefit intended for poor or
needy persons, funded by typical tax mechanisms, can be said to
be egalitarian.77 In this sense, even a dollar transferred from
persons near the top of an income or wealth distribution to persons
near the bottom of that distribution counts as egalitarian.
But for important purposes, such a minimal transfer is more
aptly described in alternative terms, with the idea of
egalitarianism being instead reserved for more thorough, rigorous,
substantially redistributive programs and power transfers of one
sort or another.78 The state constitutional requirement in Tucker
could, depending in part on the size of the benefits involved, thus
be described as minimalist rather than egalitarian. In this sense,
egalitarianism and redistributive minimalism can be seen as
naming the extremes on a redistributive continuum.7 9
Between the extremes of rigorous egalitarianism and
redistributive minimalism, crucially, are several broad theoretical
approaches that can be seen as attempts to correct some
theoretical or practical deficiencies of any form of rigorous
egalitarianism. These approaches are discussed below."'
In the meantime, though, we might simply imagine that the
state constitution in Tucker, or an equal protection clause in
general, could be interpreted to require something more
demanding than redistributive minimalism, but less demanding
than any form of rigorous egalitarianism. In particular, a welfare
rights clause as in Tucker could be interpreted, in the awkward
74. Id. at 452.
75. See id.
76. See id. ("[O]ur Constitution ... unequivocally prevents the Legislature from
simply refusing to aid those whom it has classified as needy.").
77. For discussion of why a view may or may not count as egalitarian, see IWAO
HIROSE, EGALITARIANISM 1-14 (2015).
78. See Julian Lamont & Christi Favor, Distributive Justice, STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Jan. 2, 2013), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ustice-
distributive/#Strict (discussing "strict egalitarianism" and the difficulty of
determining how to measure the goods that are to be distributed).
79. See Edward Feser, Robert Nozick (1938-2002), INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA
PHIL., www.iep.utm.edu/nozick/.
80. See infra Part V.
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jargon of the trade, as "sufficientarian," or less plausibly as
"prioritarian. 81  For immediate purposes, sufficientarianism
focuses not on equality, but on adequacy or sufficiency, or on
whether a group under consideration has "enough" of whatever is
being measured. 82  Alternatively, prioritarianism focuses on
enhancing the position of those deemed to be abject or ill-
circumstanced in some supposedly absolute, non-comparative
sense, with no special concern for sufficiency or for minimizing
inequality at any cost.8
3
Without immediately developing any of these competing
families of theories, one might note that a constitutional equal
protection provision might be best construed along the lines of any
of these theories. The Equal Protection Clause thus might
genuinely aim at equality, as somehow further specified. Or it
might aim merely at some minimal redistribution that may leave
some persons avoidably short of sufficiency in some respect. Or it
might aim at sufficiency for all, but not at equality. Or it might
aim, with special emphasis, at assisting those deemed burdened or
abject in some absolute, non-comparative sense, even if other
approaches promise greater equality by, say, damaging the
position of other groups. Or finally, as seems more plausible, the
drafters, ratifiers, and current interpreters of the Equal Protection
Clause may have largely failed to carefully consider most or all of
the above alternatives, 4  despite the advantages (and
disadvantages) of each.85
There are certainly cases in which one or more of these
interpretive possibilities were clearly under consideration by the
Court. In such cases, relatively stringent forms of egalitarianism
have typically not fared well. Perhaps the best known and most
important such case is that of San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez.6 The logic of Rodriguez does not fit precisely
81. See HIROSE, supra note 77, at 87 ("[Prioritarianism] maintains that the
amount of good certain benefits do for a person should be determined only by the
absolute level of his or her own well-being, independently of the well-being of other
people.").
82. See infra notes 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207,
208, 209 and accompanying text.
83. See infra notes 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195 and
accompanying text.
84. It does not seem plausible that judges in equal protection cases have
consistently and consciously chosen from among stringent egalitarian, minimalist,
sufficientarian, and prioritarian interpretations, with or without using such
terminology.
85. See infra Part V.
86. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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with any of the broad theoretical approaches to equality.87 But
Rodriguez involves linkages, explicit and implicit, to more than
one such approach.
Rodriguez famously applied minimum, rather than elevated,
equal protection scrutiny to alleged discrimination along the lines
of wealth and poverty,88 and to allegedly unequal public school
educational opportunities. 9 Rodriguez also declined to recognize
access to a public school education as a constitutionally
fundamental right at the federal level.90 Driven at least in part by
a sense of practicality, the Court crucially declared that "at least
where wealth is involved, the Equal Protection Clause does not
require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages." 1
Let us set aside the literal language of "precisely equal
advantages,9 2 since that formulation is simply odd. If everyone in
a race has an equal head start or advantage in the race, then no
one has a head start. The idea of an "advantage," in its most
familiar sense, is inherently relative or comparative. The
distinction between an "absolute" status and a "relative" or
"comparative" status is, however, certainly of broader importance.
We can understand why "absolute equality" 3  is not
realistically attainable in areas such as educational opportunity.
This is true even though "equal" is clearly not a synonym for
"same," or "identical," or "uniform."94  School budgets, and even
school enrollments, cannot be predicted beyond some level of
precision, and it is often difficult to measure teacher effectiveness
in a classroom, or to determine how physical facilities, curricula,
87. See infra Part III.
88. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 23-25.
89. JId.
90. Id. at 40.
91. Id. at 24.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Note that when we do basic math, we say that two plus three equals five
more often than we say that they are identical, or the same thing. More
practically, depending on value judgments or market prices, we may say that A and
B have received equal gifts from C even if A has received a pendant and B a pin-
not the same gift. For a contrary but implausible linkage of equality to similarity




and extracurricular activities affect educational opportunities. 9
Can an advantage in one respect counterbalance a disadvantage in
another?
These inevitable complications, however, do not justify the
Rodriguez Court's repeated emphasis, under the Equal Protection
Clause, that the plaintiffs were not absolutely or completely
denied the opportunity to attend a public school.96 Without a
doubt, the plaintiffs were not denied any public school educational
opportunity at all. How constitutionally significant this should be,
however, is at best unclear.
Literally, the Court must apply not a "minimal protection
clause," or a "some protection clause," or even an "adequate" or
"sufficient protection clause," but instead it must apply an Equal
Protection Clause, whether we take practical complications into
account or not. Dividing a coveted pie equally between A and B
may involve practices such as A doing the slicing and B choosing
between the slices. No one expects precise equality beyond a
certain degree, but the idea of equality clearly compares the two
slices. A's slice can be equal to B's only via comparison.
Thus, equality in itself, and presumably as incorporated into
the idea of equality of protection of the laws, is inescapably
relative. We would not normally say that A has a slice equal to B's
merely because A has some minimal or even substantial amount of
pie. Nor would we normally say that A has been accorded the
equal protection of some law merely because A had received some
minimal or even substantial degree of protection in the relevant
respect. Nor, typically, would we say that A has a slice of pie
equal to B's slice merely because A's slice is in itself adequate, or
sufficient, for A's purposes. We would not even say that because A
is adequately protected by the laws, for A's own independent
purposes, A must therefore be enjoying a degree of legal protection
equal to that of B.9'
95. See Alex J. Bowers & Angela Urick, Does High School Facility Quality
Affect Student Achievement? A Two-Level Hierarchical Linear Model, 37 J. EDU.
FIN. 72, 92 (2011) ("In conclusion, the implications of our findings for
administrators, policymakers, and researchers is that while we were unable to find
a direct effect of facility disrepair on student achievement, this does not necessarily
mean that facilities and achievement are not related.").
96. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 19-24.
97. Nor does affording person A some degree of protection imply that A is
thereby receiving the proper degree of protection under a prioritarian theory of
distribution.
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The Rodriguez Court, however, opts for only limited equal
protection scrutiny of the Texas school funding system because the
plaintiffs were not absolutely denied all education. Whether the
Court would apply analogous logic to equal protection cases
involving, say, contestable vote dilution,8  or a realistically
affordable but somewhat burdensome poll tax,99 is, however,
unclear.
This is not to suggest that the Court in Rodriguez thought of
genuine equality of educational opportunity and some merely
minimal educational opportunity as themselves exhausting all of
the ways in which the Equal Protection Clause might be
interpreted in this kind of case.1 0 In fact, the Court refers several
times to the presumed Texas intent to provide, specifically, for an
"adequate" education for all public school students.11  If the
Court's decision in Rodriguez actually placed any weight on the
asserted availability of universally adequate educational
opportunities, that reliance on substantive adequacy would
actually suggest a link to what are called "sufficientarian"
'10 2
approaches to questions of inequality and distributive justice.
The important point for our purposes is that, whatever one
thinks of the outcome in Rodriguez, the logic of Rodriguez does not
seem to have been usefully guided, even indirectly, by any sort of
then-available theory of equality. The problem is not that judges
fail by declining to place themselves entirely in the hands of the
philosophers of the day. Instead, the basic problem is that the
judges seem not to have substantially benefitted from the work of
those who have thought hardest about the idea of equality that is
written into the Equal Protection Clause itself. 'o
98. See generally Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 744 (1983) ("[T]he
population deviations in the plan were not functionally equal as a matter of law,
and... the plan was not a good-faith effort to achieve population equality using the
best available census data."); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 537 (1969) ("A
State's preference for pleasingly shaped districts can hardly justify population
variances."); Reynold v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 563 (1964) (deciding that legislative
districts must contain roughly equal populations).
99. See generally Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (finding
Virginia's $1.50 poll tax to violate the Equal Protection Clause).
100. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 19-24. Nor is this to claim that the Court must be
consciously or even subconsciously applying some version of a broad theoretical
approach to the idea of equality.
101. Id. at 24.
102. See infra Part V.
103. There is, of course, no explicit equal protection clause to bind the federal
government, as opposed to the states. But federal equal protection jurisprudence
ultimately relies on the idea of equality-presumably the same idea of equality as
embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment binding the states. See Adarand
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Of course, constitutional problems of basic equality are
hardly confined to the contexts referred to above. There are
commonalities as well as disparate themes among inequalities of
basic legal personhood, 114 sex and gender,0
5 sexual orientation, 106
and a range of disabilities,1 0 7 among other categories. All such
categories should have their place in an account of why courts
addressing the most crucial equal protection cases have drawn so
minimally on the best range of thinking about the underlying idea
of equality itself To begin such a task, we address the initial
problem of the grounds, bases, or justifications often thought to
underlie the idea of the equality of persons, and the fragmenting
disarray into which discussion of such matters has fallen.
Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (imposing essentially the same
strict scrutiny equal protection test on all racial classifications at both federal and
state governmental levels regardless of whether the classifications are purportedly
benign and remedial); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (recruiting the
ideas of due process, unfairness, and severity under the Fifth Amendment to
perform equal-protection-like tasks).
104. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 404-06 (1856) ("[T]hey were at that
time considered as a subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been
subjugated by the dominant race, and whether emancipated or not, yet remained
subject to their authority, and had no rights or privileges but such as those who
held the power and the Government might choose to grant them.").
105. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (setting forth the basic mid-
level scrutiny test for intentional or textual discrimination against men or
women-presumably both); see also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533-34
(1996) (seeking to legitimize a role for presumably inherent, constitutionally
relevant differences where those policies are non-invidious or compensatory);
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-85 (1973) (noting the existence of gross
sexual stereotypes, as well as classifications that were intended to place women on
a "pedestal," but which resulted in confinement to a "cage").
106. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2681 (2013) (referring
to an "evolving understanding of the meaning of equality" and emphasizing equal
dignity, as distinct from indignity, humiliation, demeaning treatment, degrading
treatment, disparaging treatment, and inequality of respect); Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558, 582 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Moral disapproval of this
group, like a bare desire to harm the group, is an interest that is insufficient to
satisfy rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause."). This
presumably does not suggest that all serious unconstitutional inequalities count as
humiliating or demeaning. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015)
("It is now clear that the challenged laws burden the liberty of same-sex couples,
and it must be further acknowledged that they abridge central precepts of
equality.").
107. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 528 (2004) (referring to "the
sheer volume of evidence demonstrating the nature and extent of unconstitutional
discrimination against persons with disabilities in the provision of public services");
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 444 (1985) ('The
Education of the Handicapped Act ... requires an 'appropriate' education, not one
that is equal in all respects."). Presumably, such cases could benefit from our best
thinking on the role of what might be called "background luck" in endowments, the
role of prioritarian and sufficientarian theories, and of utility maximization.
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IL Murky Justifications of the Equality of Persons
The question of why, ultimately, persons should be treated as
equals is inescapable, even for a judge who is already committed to
carrying out the Equal Protection Clause. The scope and depth of
equal protection must ultimately reflect what courts assume to be
the reasons why persons are to be treated equally and the limits of
those reasons. As we shall shortly see,1"8 there are various
potentially conflicting ways in which people could be treated
equally. Choosing what is to be equalized among persons will
reflect what we believe to be the basic reasons for treating persons
as equal in the first place." 9 Judges interpreting the Constitution
thus cannot bypass such issues.
The problem for these judges, however, is that when the
scholars do not bypass the question of what justifies equality, their
answers are in disarray, thus discouraging any general judicial
reliance. Professor Jeremy Waldron observes that "although there
is plenty of work on equality, there is precious little in the modern
literature on the background idea that we humans are,
fundamentally, one another's equals." '
The theories we do have regarding the justification11 of
equality tend to inhibit judicial confidence in their broad use. 2
This is not at all a matter of any decisive refutation of such
theories. In some ways, that would simplify matters for judges.
Instead, many diverse attempts to justify equality remain on the
table, with each such attempt continuing to bear its own
limitations.
108. See infra Part III.
109. See Ian Carter, Respect and the Basis of Equality, 121 ETHICS 538, 543
(2011) ("[1]t is mistaken to answer the question 'Equality of What?' in isolation from
the basis of equality."). The idea of bases, justifications, or grounds of equality
must be understood quite broadly; pragmatists and other sorts of anti-
foundationalists and anti-metaphysicians are equally bound to offer some account
of why equality is a good or pragmatic thing, and which forms of equality should
take priority.
110. JEREMY WALDRON, GOD, LOCKE, AND EQUALITY 2 (2002); see also Carter,
supra note 109, at 539 ("With a few notable exceptions, the task of identifying [the
basis or bases of equality] has been strangely neglected by contemporary
egalitarians."). It would not be surprising if the rise of less metaphysically
ambitious schools of thought corresponded with reduced interest in such questions.
See JAMES GRIFFIN, ON HUMAN RIGHTS 2 (2008) ("When during the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries the theological content of the idea was abandoned,
nothing was put in its place.").
111. Any use of the singular is not intended to rule out multi-factor or multi-
level pluralist justifications of equality.
112. See Kate Malleson, Justifying Gender Equality on the Bench: Why
Difference Won't Do, 11 FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 1 (2003).
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Thus, some attempts to justify equality emphasize empirical
qualities of human persons. 113 An immediate, though hardly fatal,
problem is that, for whatever reason, persons are obviously not
more or less precisely equal in all arguably relevant empirical
respects. 114 But if we avoid the problems associated with empirical
grounds for equality by looking to non-empirical qualities,1 we
run straight into the problem of relying on dubious or obsolete
metaphysical claims. 16
There is thus an understandable tendency to try to work
through the problems associated with empirically-oriented
justifications of equality. One possibility is to deny that persons
must in fact be equal in the empirical qualities, whatever those
qualities may be, by virtue of which they should be treated
equally. 7 Perhaps what should trigger treating A equally with B
is not that A and B are more or less precisely equal in some
relevant respect, but that A (along with B) has exceeded some
relevant minimum threshold value with respect to the quality in
question. 11
Suppose, for example, that a court is to decide A's voting
rights claim under the Equal Protection Clause. 1 9 The idea of
equality might suggest to some persons that A's voting strength
should be ninety percent of B's if A's relevant voting capabilities
113. See Carter, supra note 109, at 544 ("There is no empirically based reason to
suppose that people are equally capable of setting ends rationally or are equally
capable of acting for the sake of duty.., or even that they are equally capable of
trying to do so.").
114. See id. at 543-44. Even Thomas Hobbes argues only for a rough or
pragmatic equality among adult persons. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 86-87
(Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (1651).
115. See Carter, supra note 109, at 544 (referring to the Kantian non-empirical
noumenal self).
116. See id.; see also JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (2d ed. 2005) (arguing
against basing legal policy on controversial metaphysical or religious assumptions).
117. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Basic Equality 29 (N.Y.U. Pub. L. & Legal
Theory Res. Paper Series, Working Paper 08-61, 2008), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1311816 (arguing against the model that humans are characteristically
similar to the exact equal degree).
118. See, e.g., Richard Arneson, Egalitarianism, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY 41 (rev. ed. 2013) [hereinafter Arneson, Egalitarianism],
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/egalitarianism ("The doctrine of sufficiency holds
that it is morally valuable that as many as possible of all who shall ever live should
enjoy conditions of life that place them above the threshold that marks the
minimum required for a decent (good enough) quality of life."); see also GEORGE
SHER, EQUALITY FOR INEGALITARIANS 79 (2014) [hereinafter SHER, EQUALITY FOR
INEGALITARIANS] (presenting moral equality as based on our having a particular
kind of conscious subjectivity).
119. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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are deemed to be ninety percent of B's.121 But equality in the
voting-rights equal protection context might instead suggest the
idea of a crucial threshold of whatever quality or qualities we
think relevant. Perhaps persons should be granted voting rights-
and specifically equal voting rights-once they have passed a
threshold level of some relevant capability. The threshold in
question might even incorporate a large element of administrative
convenience, as in the case of minimum voting ages. Above that
threshold level, any differences among persons in maturity,
informedness, interest, experiences, integrity, and sagacity would
be irrelevant.
121
Paying exclusive attention to threshold levels of the
supposedly relevant quality or qualities thus avoids some basic
problems in justifying equal treatment. But a further crucial
complication is that the courts would need to know why passing
some threshold level should be decisive, rather than considering
any of the remaining inequalities among persons.1 2 2  And there
must also be some justification for adopting one threshold level as
decisive over another. 123
There may well be possible solutions for these problems.
41 2
However, the various approaches seem to involve more controversy
and mutual conflict than reassurance and mutual supportiveness.
120. See JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT 52 (CreateSpace 2015) (1861).
121. See Arneson, Egalitarianism, supra note 118, at 41.
122. See Geoffrey Cupit, The Basis of Equality, 75 PHIL. 105, 110 (2000) ("Why
should we suppose that our status is determined by our passing a particular
threshold, whilst our possessing more than the minimum required to pass that
threshold is entirely redundant?").
123. See id. Before offering his own proposed alternative, Professor Cupit
reflects that "it is not encouraging to note that even committed egalitarians admit
to knowing of no satisfactory argument for our equality." Id. at 116.
124. One possible approach would involve a non-metaphysical claim that, while
we are not relevantly equal, we are all unique, or not replaceable. This approach
thus focuses on our incommensurability or our mutual incomparability, not on our
equality or inequality. See, e.g., JONATHAN GLOVER, CAUSING DEATH AND SAVINGS
LIVES 228 (1977) (quoting the George Orwell dictum "one mind less, one world
less").
John Rawls's approach would hold that equal justice is owed to all moral
persons. See RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 66, at 505. In turn, moral
persons are capable of having a rational plan of life and are capable of at least a
minimally effective sense of justice. See id. Rawls himself recognizes the
incompleteness of his argument in this respect. See id. at 509; see also JOHN
RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS (1958), reprinted in JUSTICE AND EQUALITY 76 (Hugo
A. Bedau ed., 1971) (discussing the concept of justice and how it interacts with
morality). For a more elaborate, but correspondingly complex, approach to the
grounds of equality, see Bernard Williams, The Idea of Equality (1962), reprinted in
PROBLEMS OF THE SELF: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 1956-1972, at 230 (1973).
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Here, as elsewhere, it is easy to understand why the courts would
be reluctant to begin to try to work through the complications, and
to place any consistent weight on their results.
But the conspicuously unresolved status of any underlying
justification of treating persons as equals is merely the beginning
of the accumulation of obstacles to meaningful judicial reliance on
any theories of equality. At least equally daunting are the
remarkably proliferating typologies of the forms and metrics of
equality and inequality, as briefly introduced below.
III. Equality of What? A Glance at a Few of the Proliferat-
ing Typologies
The idea of equality, including equality for constitutional
equal protection purposes, can be interpreted in minimalist terms,
or else in remarkably stringent terms, or with any degree of
stringency between these extremes. In some views, by analogy, we
treat runners equally when we give them all the same ribbons. In
other views, we treat the runners equally in awarding the first
place ribbon to the fastest runner who has complied with the rules.
Thus, while we may say that distribution in accordance with
a person's different (genuine) needs is a rule of equality,125 we
might also claim to be respecting equality if we distribute a
resource on the basis of agreements freely and genuinely entered
into,12 6 or in accordance with whatever we take to be a person's
worth, 7 or a person's contribution or merit,2 or a person's work or
genuine effort. 9 These distributional principles could all be called
egalitarian in at least some broad sense.1 3  In general, the
availability of a broad range of undemanding to exceptionally
demanding forms of egalitarianism further complicates matters for
judges seeking guidance.
125. See Gregory Vlastos, Justice and Equality, in SOCIAL JUSTICE 31, 35





130. One should also consider the difference in the egalitarian "strength" of
these two related principles: (1) "Every man has a right to equal property," and (2)
"Every man has an equal right to [some degree of] property." Richard Wollheim,
Equality, 56 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y 281, 282 (1956). One should further
consider principles of equal opportunity ranging from merely formalist or
minimalist to those that would require the radical restructuring of the family. See
T.M. Scanlon, When Does Equality Matter?, Presentation at John F. Kennedy
School of Government (April 2004), www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/
intellectual life (discussing RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 124).
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More crucially, though, the theorists have not arrived at a
consensus answer to the question: Equality of what? The various
answers arrived at by theorists are at least as much mutually
conflicting as they are mutually supporting. Nor does any
consensual resolution seem to be on the horizon. The scholars
have formulated the major "equality of what?" candidates in
various ways. The Nobel Prize-winning economist Amartya Sen
refers, open-endedly, to equality of "[l]iberties, rights, utilities,
incomes, resources, primary goods, need-fulfillments, etc." '131 In a
different but equally open-ended theory, 13 2 the noted philosopher
Harry Frankfurt refers to equality of "resources, welfare,
opportunity, respect, rights, consideration, [and] concern .... ""'
And the leading legal philosopher Joseph Raz, for his part,
concludes: "Most of the popular egalitarian principles belong to
one of four types: (a) All are entitled to equal respect: (b) All are
entitled to equal opportunities: (c) All are entitled to equal welfare:
(d) To each according to his needs." '134
Some of the above goods that could be stated in substantive
terms-e.g., welfare, resources, income, and utility-could instead
be discussed in terms of equal access to (or equal opportunity to
obtain) those substantive goods.135  Equal access, and equal
opportunity, can clearly be thought of in more and in less stringent
terms. 136
Nor are the above criteria exhaustive. Equality of various
forms of power, or of non-domination, could easily be added. It can
be useful to extensively contrast, say, equality of welfare with
equality of resources. 13 But even the broadest such contrasts may
131. AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 25 (1992). Elsewhere Professor
Sen singles out "utilitarian equality, total utility equality, and Rawlsian equality."
Amartya Sen, Equality of What? Lecture at Stanford University's Tanner Lectures
on Human Values 179 (May 22, 1979) [hereinafter Sen, Equality of What?].
132. See Harry Frankfurt, Equality and Respect, 64 Soc. RES. 3, 4 (1997).
133. Id. at 8.
134. Joseph Raz, Principles of Equality, 87 MIND 321, 340 (1978). Raz also
distinguishes between "rhetorical and strict egalitarian theories." Id. at 321.
135. See G.A. Cohen, On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, 99 ETHICS 906, 907
(1989) [hereinafter Cohen, Egalitarian Justice] (discussing the differences between
the views of John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin); see also G.A. Cohen, Equality of
What? Welfare, Goods and Capabilities, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE 11 (Martha
Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993) [hereinafter Cohen, Equality of What?].
136. See Scanlon, supra note 130.
137. This is undertaken most famously by Ronald Dworkin. See Ronald
Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part I: Equality of Welfare, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 185,
191 (1981); Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283, 290 (1981). These works were compiled in RONALD
DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 11-119
(2000) [hereinafter DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE].
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underemphasize the importance of equal capacities, or the equal
capability of people to do or be what they choose, 138 which is a
more functional or developmental approach.
It may be possible, to some degree, to combine two or more of
the above criteria in some creative and sophisticated way. The
philosopher G.A. Cohen, for example, held that in developing a
metric for equality, "both welfare and resources should count."
1 39
Of course, there will always be conflicts between, say, equality of
income or wealth and equality of capability or of well-being, given
differences of need among persons.1 4  Equal income or wealth for
those with and without expensive congenital disabilities is hardly
the most meaningful sort of equality.
1 41
138. Norman Daniels, Equality of Uhat: Welfare, Resources, or Capabilities?, 50
PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 273, 274 (1990). Dworkin addresses capability
theories of equality in SOVEREIGN VIRTUE, supra note 137, at 285-303. For a
discussion among the most prominent advocates of equality of (crucial) capabilities
or functions, see Martha Nussbaum, Women and Equality: The Capabilities
Approach, 138 INT'L LAB. REV. 227, 233 (1999) (emphasizing the importance of
asking "not just about the resources that are present, but about how those do or do
not go to work, enabling the woman to function").
139. G.A. COHEN, IF YOU'RE AN EGALITARIAN, HOW COME YOU'RE So RICH? 177
(2000).
140. See Sen, Equality of What?, supra note 131.
141. Classically, Henry Sidgwick focused on equality of happiness and
recognized that equality of distributed resources would not account for substantial
differences among persons in their basic needs. See HENRY SIDGWICK, THE
METHODS OF ETHICS 284-85 n.2 (7th ed. 1962) (1907). But mental or psychological
needs, artificially expensive tastes and contrived mental needs, and differences in
how efficiently persons convert inputs into happiness lead to endless further
complications. See id.; see also DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE, supra note 137, at
11-64; WILL KYMLICKA, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 72-73 (1990)
("Why treat people born with natural handicaps any differently? Why should they
not also have a claim to compensation for their disadvantage ... ?").
For general background on the idea of desert as an approach to justice, see
GEORGE SHER, DESERT (1987) (reviewing desert-claims arising in connection with
wages, honors, rewards, and penalties, and elaborating on the justifications); WHAT
Do WE DESERVE? A READER ON JUSTICE AND DESERT (Louis P. Pojman & Owen
McLeod eds., 1999) (containing a collection of readings that contextualize the
development of desert claims and analyzing divisions in contemporary perspectives
on the issue); James P. Sterba, Justice as Desert, 3 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 101
(1974) (focusing on the role of needs and deserts in conceptualizing social justice).
For further discussion of needs-based approaches to justice, see DAVID
BRAYBROOKE, MEETING NEEDS (1987); Michael Ignatieff, To Each According to His
(Genuine?) Needs, 11 POL. THEORY 419 (1983). For a critique of a needs-based
approach to equality, see DOUGLAS RAE ET AL., EQUALITIES 99-100 (1981). Rae's
book also offers a forest of distinctions and complications relevant to the decisions
of equal protection cases well beyond the few introduced in this Article. Id.
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Further complications within the idea of equality could be
offered, at any length. 14 2 One basic lesson, though, is that while
courts might want to accommodate more than one reasonably
complete theory of equality within, or underlying, their
understanding of equal protection, and the greater the number
and variety of such theories the courts attempt to assimilate in
any fashion, the lower the chances that the courts will realistically
be able to do so. 43
At this point, it is not surprising that the courts, in general,
have not made systematic use of theories of what should count as
equality, or as the most important forms and measures of equality,
for equal protection purposes. And we have not yet considered the
basic further question of how stringent or demanding the most
justifiable approach to equality should be. 44  Before briefly
addressing this basic stringency question, though, we should
pause to consider whether the judicial task could be simplified
through the important idea known as luck egalitarianism.
142. Consider some of the rather abstract, but clearly significant, distinctions
drawn by Professor Larry Temkin. See LARRY S. TEMKIN, INEQUALITY 283 (1993)
[hereinafter TEMKIN, INEQUALITY]. Comparisons among persons and among groups
can take several potentially conflicting forms. Id. So, should we compare a
particular person (or group) with the best-off person? The (tenth of) one-
percenters? The average person? Or with all those who are deemed better off?
And while we are engaged in such comparisons, should we (and the judges) focus on
alleged inequalities as they are likely to play out over entire lifetimes? Should
judges focus on the persons or groups as they are at the time of a given lawsuit? Or
should judges instead focus on comparing persons or groups when they are both at
the same life-stage, e.g., ready to retire, or at a particular age? Differences among
these approaches could sensibly lead to very different equal protection outcomes
and remedies. Id. at 285. And there is no reason to simply defer on these
debatable matters of principle to the preferences and pleadings of plaintiffs and
defendants in equal protection cases. Finally, note the distinction, drawn from the
work of Derek Parfit, between instrumental and non-instrumental forms of
egalitarianism. Id. For concise discussion, see Larry S. Temkin, Egalitarianism
Defended, 113 ETHICS 764, 768 (2003) [hereinafter Temkin, Egalitarianism
Defended] (explaining that, in instrumental egalitarianism, "the value of equality is
wholly derived from the value of other ideals whose non-egalitarian goods it
promotes," whereas in non-instrumental egalitarianism, "equality, understood as
comparative fairness, is intrinsically valuable, in the sense that it is sometimes
valuable in itself, over and above the extent to which it promotes other ideals").
143. Professor Sen, for example, argues that hybrid forms of utilitarian and
Rawlsian approaches to equality cannot be successfully combined. See Sen,
Equality of What?, supra note 131 ("[W]hile they fail in rather different and
contrasting ways, an adequate theory cannot be constructed even on the[ir]
combined grounds .... "). At some point, additional judicial time and attention
devoted to any such matters will be better allocated to other aspects of
constitutional adjudication.
144. See infra Part V.
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IV. A Failed Attempt to Limit the Complications: The Luck
of Imposed Circumstances Versus the Luck of Free and
Responsible Gambles
It may seem possible to slice through many of the
complications of equality by thinking about different kinds of luck.
Suppose someone is born with a serious disability that can be
effectively treated, but only at a cost beyond that person's ability
to pay. Should an egalitarian consider such a case to be merely a
natural phenomenon, beyond any redress or compensation?
Suppose also that another person has freely, knowledgeably, and
responsibly wagered a large sum of money on the outcome of the
Super Bowl and loses. Should an egalitarian treat that kind of
luck in the same way as the genetic bad luck in the first case?
These apparently easy cases underlie the appeal of what is called
luck egalitarianism, famously developed, 14' but then partially
disavowed,146 by Ronald Dworkin.
To begin with, luck egalitarianism holds that "the idea of the
moral equality of persons requires that each person take
responsibility for [his or] her choices and assume the costs of these
choices., 1 41 Alternatively, "luck egalitarianism claims that
inequality is bad or unjust if it reflects differences in factors that
are beyond the control or choice of the worse off.,1 4  The luck
egalitarian thus looks not only at a person's assets or at their
degree of happiness, but he or she also looks at the genuine
opportunities that have been realistically available to the person. 
1 49
For example, the basic assumption is that being born with an
expensively treatable genetic disease is not chosen, consented to,
145. On the initial distinctions between "brute" and "option" luck and the
normative role in egalitarianism of compensation based on purchases in
hypothetical insurance markets, see DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE, supra note 137,
at 73-83.
146. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Equality, Luck and Hierarchy, 31 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 190, 190-91 (2003) (arguing that the central idea of equality of resources is
not "that people be fully compensated for any bad luck after it has occurred, but
rather that people be made equal ... so ... in their opportunity to insure or provide
against bad luck before it has occurred, or, if that is not possible, that people be
awarded the compensation it is likely they would have insured to have if they had
had that opportunity"). For a key earlier source, see RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE,
supra note 66, at 7, 9 (focusing on principles that regulate the basic social
institutions that constitute "the basic structure of society").
147. Kok-Chor Tan, A Defense of Luck Egalitarianism, 105 J. PHIL. 665, 665
(2008).
148. HIROSE, EGALITARIANISM, supra note 77, at 41; see also Temkin,
Egalitarianism Defended, supra note 142, at 767 ("Undeserved inequality is unfair,
but deserved inequality is not.").
149. See, e.g., Cohen, Equality of What?, supra note 135, at 362 (distinguishing
equality of genuine opportunities for welfare from equality of welfare itself).
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or controlled by the person directly affected and is thus morally
arbitrary, 15 0 amounting to an undeserved inequality. This opens
the door to one form or another of subsidized cure, redress, or
compensation in the name of egalitarianism. 151
It is not our aim herein to critique luck egalitarianism,1 2 or
any other form of egalitarianism. The point, rather, is to suggest a
few of its burgeoning complications, and, on that basis, its limited
usefulness for courts deciding constitutional issues. Luck
egalitarianism is ultimately no solution to the problem of the
proliferating complications of equality theory, and, indeed, it
further contributes to such complications.
To begin with, much of what constitutes persons' very
identities lies partly or entirely beyond their voluntary choices.
Unchosen natural and social circumstances include not only the
economic class of one's parents,1 5 3 but also what are sometimes
considered to include "one's native abilities and intelligence, 5 4
among other constituent traits. More broadly, one scholar has
argued that even "[o]ur race, gender, and citizenship, how
educated and wealthy we are, how gifted in math and how fluent
150. See, e.g., PHILIPPE VAN PARIJS, WHAT'S WRONG WITH A FREE LUNCH? 25-26
(Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers eds., 2001) ("Not even the most narcissistic self-made
man could think that he fixed the parental dice in advance of entering this world.
Such gifts of luck are unavoidable and, if they are fairly distributed,
unobjectionable.").
151. Id. at 24-26.
152. One prominent form of "external" critique of luck egalitarianism comes from
writers who are less interested in sorting through the various forms of luck, their
boundaries, and their moral implications than in opposing what they take to be the
various forms of social oppression, domination, and hierarchy. As one leading critic
holds: "The proper negative aim of egalitarian justice is not to eliminate the impact
of brute luck from human affairs, but to end oppression, which by definition is
socially imposed. Its proper positive aim is not to ensure that everyone gets what
they morally deserve, but to create a community in which people stand in relations
of equality to others." Elizabeth S. Anderson, What Is the Point of Equality?, 109
ETHICS 287, 288-89 (1999); see also MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A
DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY xii (1983) ("[Equality's] targets are always
specific: aristocratic privilege, capitalist wealth, bureaucratic power, racial or
sexual supremacy [or other forms of domination.]"); IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE
AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE (1990) (noting that a conception of justice should
begin with the concepts of "domination and oppression," instead of focusing on
distribution); Samuel Scheffler, What Is Egalitarianism?, 31 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 5
(2003) [hereinafter Scheffler, VWat Is Egalitarianism?]. The extent to which some
moderate forms of luck egalitarianism must differ with the anti-oppression
critiques, beyond differences in emphasis, is unclear.
153. Here, we can assume some tenable distinction between "natural" and
"social" circumstances, wherever we choose to draw that line. See Scheffler, What




in English, how handsome and even how ambitious, are
overwhelmingly a function of who our parents happened to be and
of other equally arbitrary contingencies."1 5
It is easy for most of us to see inheriting a particular genetic
marker as morally arbitrary and undeserved. But it is also
possible to see some environmental advantages afforded to a child,
not as deserved by that child, but as conceivably deserved rewards
conferred on ambitious, self-disciplined, self-sacrificing parents.
This latter view may, however, just push the problem of
arbitrariness back a generation. This is, again, not to pass
judgment on any such views. While some theorists believe that
one's effort and ambition are the largely arbitrary reflection of,
among other influences, our parents,5 6 others, including leading
philosopher Thomas Nagel, believe that "apart from pathological
conditions, the level of someone's effort is the result of free
choice."5 7
Unfortunately, fundamental political and metaphysical
disputes over what counts as a free or responsible choice-and
indeed, whether there are any sufficiently free and responsible
choices-are at this point inescapable. As a culture, we do not
know what to say about such matters. Perhaps we should try to
set aside such issues, or somehow resolve them merely politically.
Our "massive confusion about personal responsibility" ' is evident.
The question of "what really is beyond a person's control is
intensely controversial" ' 9 and certainly not susceptible to any
resolution reflected in constitutional case law. Thus, it has been
155. VAN PARIJS, supra note 150, at 25.
156. See id. at 58; Nicholas Barry, Reassessing Luck Egalitarianism, 70 J. POL.
136, 140 (2008).
157. THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY 118 (1991).
158. Nancy L. Rosenblum, Civic Equality, BOS. REV. (Apr./May 1995),
http://bostonreview.net/BR20.2/Rosenblum.html.
159. Samuel Scheffler, An Unfunded Mandate, BOS. REV. (May/June 1995),
http://bostonreview.net/BR20.2/Scheffler.html. For some jurisprudential
implications in the criminal responsibility context, see Wright, Criminal Law and
Sentencing, supra note 14. For a few of the most interesting current perspectives
on free will and responsibility, see DANIEL DENNETT, FREEDOM EVOLVES (2004);
DERK PEREBOOM, FREE WILL, AGENCY, AND MEANING IN LIFE (2014); DERK
PEREBOOM, LIVING WITHOUT FREE WILL (2006); SAUL SMILANSKY, FREE WILL AND
ILLUSION (2002); GALEN STRAWSON, FREEDOM AND BELIEF (rev. ed. 2010).
Collectively, see LIBERTARIAN FREE WILL: CONTEMPORARY DEBATES (David Palmer
ed., 2014).
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recognized in particular that luck egalitarians-not exclusively,
but most distinctively-are deeply enmeshed in what has been
called the "free will problem.""16
Consider that, if we take one hard-nosed but popular
approach in denying the reality of genuine freedom and choice,161
at a minimum, some apparently different approaches to equality
collapse into each another. Imagine thus a world of clockwork
mechanisms, or of initial world conditions and inescapable
physical laws, or of some form of programming, such that free and
responsible choice, robustly understood, is impossible.
Envisioning humans as complex, sentient, organic robots may help
establish this problem.
On such a basis, some have concluded that the distinction
between the genuine (mere) opportunity to acquire some good and
the straightforward (actual) acquiring of that good dissolves. 112
Equal opportunity in some respects, and equality of actual results
in that respect, come invariably to the same thing."3 If the results
were not equal, it would follow, on the above assumption of a
mechanistic clockwork universe, that the opportunity for equal
results could not have been real. There is no room in such a
picture for a chain of causation to be disrupted or rerouted by a
genuinely free choice. One might as well say that a falling rock
had a real opportunity to fall at a speed other than it did.
The real problem, however, is not that assuming a
mechanistic universe or something like it alters the menu of
egalitarian options. Such a universe more fundamentally
undermines much of the motivational logic of consistent
egalitarianism-at substantial net long-term personal cost-in the
first place. 64
160. See Cohen, Egalitarian Justice, supra note 135, at 933-34; Scheffler, What
Is Egalitarianism?, supra note 152, at 17-18; Temkin, Egalitarianism Defended,
supra note 142, at 767.
161. See THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FREE WILL (Robert Kane ed., 2d ed. 2011)
(representing the concept of free will broadly).
162. See, e.g., Richard J. Arneson, Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare,
56 PHIL. STUD. 77, 86 (1989) (discussing the reality of decision-making
opportunities).
163. See id.; Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Egalitarianism, Option Luck, and
Responsibility, 111 ETHICS 548, 548 n.3 (2001); Saul Smilansky, Choice-
Egalitarianism and the Paradox of the Baseline: A Reply to Manor, 65 ANALYSIS
333, 335 (2005).
164. For discussion, see Wright, Criminal Law and Sentencing, supra note 14.
Interestingly, G.A. Cohen approvingly cites John Rawls as arguing that, without a
strong form of free will, "many of our customary judgments of the moral worth of
people would make no sense." G.A. COHEN, RESCUING JUSTICE AND EQUALITY 14
(2008) [hereinafter COHEN, RESCUING JUSTICE].
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Imagine a conversation between two humans, thought of as
sentient, complex, organic, programmed robots of some sort.
Human A says to human B: "You have $100.00, and I have only
$50.00. You, as the only other relevant human for present
purposes, ought to give me $25.00, so that we both have $75.00, in
the name of equality." B then asks, "Why should I?" A responds,
"Because that is what you morally ought to do under the
circumstances, given our various emotions and our natures as
sentient, complex, organic, programmed robots."
More broadly, why anyone should embrace substantial net
long-term personal costs, including suffering, is unclear under
these circumstances. Nor, importantly, does it make much of a
difference if we add in the role of groups, or of separation in time
and distance, or of entirely random departures from the otherwise
determinative lines of causation. The reasonable motivation
problem in persuading B is even more severe if A and B will not, or
cannot, otherwise significantly affect one another, even indirectly,
and if the transfers must be substantial or sustained over time. A
principled egalitarianism is, in such a case, arbitrary, if not
irrational.
So luck egalitarians in particular, if not egalitarians of every
kind, will need some way to avoid going down this path.
Fortunately-or unfortunately, in the case of generalist judges-
there seems to be several possible responses. One is to declare
that, regardless of what they believe about causation and
randomness, humans, for the most part, simply cannot abandon
familiar basic attitudes-"reactive attitudes" 165 -toward freedom,
choice, and responsibility.166 Another response is to endorse some
otherwise reasonable view of choice and causation that solves or
bypasses this problem.1 7 A third response would be to declare that
devising any necessary solutions to problems of causation,
freedom, and choice should be left to academic specialists in such
matters-individuals distinct from egalitarian theorists. 168 A
165. For the classic discussion on this topic, see P.F. Strawson, Freedom and
Resentment (1962), reprinted in PERSPECTIVES ON MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 45 (John
Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza eds., 1994); see also Galen Strawson, On 'Freedom
and Resentment", in FREE WILL AND REACTIVE ATTITUDES: PERSPECTIVES ON P.F.
STRAWSON'S "FREEDOM AND RESENTMENT" 85 (Michael McKenna & Paul Russel
eds., 2008) (presenting an interesting critique).
166. See Marc Fleurbaey, Equality of Resources Revisited, 113 ETHICS 82, 84
(2002); Carl Knight, Luck Egalitarianism, 8 PHIL. COMPASS 924, 926-27 (2013).
167. See DAVID HODGSON, RATIONALITY + CONSCIOUSNESS - FREE WILL (2012);
RICHARD SWINBURNE, MIND, BRAIN, AND FREE WILL (2013); PETER VAN INWAGEN,
AN ESSAY ON FREE WILL (1986); Fleurbaey, supra note 166, at 84.
168. See Richard J. Arneson, Luck Egalitarianism, 32 PHIL. TOPICS 1, 16 (2004).
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fourth possible response would be to try to set aside problems of
freedom, choice, and responsibility as problems of philosophy in
general, or of metaphysics in particular, and to treat them instead
as political problems to be resolved by some appropriate
democratic process."'
Again, the point is not to endorse or reject any of these
alternatives. Instead, the idea is that, at some early stage, any
judge considering the possibility of generally drawing upon
egalitarian theory to enhance equal protection jurisprudence
should feel overwhelmed by the utterly unmanageable options.
Nor have we at this point encountered all of the most
important unsolved problems and alternatives involving luck
egalitarianism. Consider one such problem: Do egalitarians really
wish to address all significant unchosen inequalities, while leaving
unaddressed the personal adverse effects of all free and
responsible, but disastrous, choices? Do egalitarians, including
luck egalitarians, really wish to always unforgivingly leave freely
and responsibly ruined lives to private charity?170 Familiar legal
Professor Arneson is the author of a very useful introduction to contemporary
egalitarianism. Arneson, Egalitarianism, supra note 118.
169. See MARION SMILEY, MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE BOUNDARIES OF
COMMUNITY 14 (1992) (describing the basis of work as "focusing on moral
responsibility itself rather than on notions of free will" and as "view[ing] the
modern concept of moral responsibility as part of social and political practice rather
than an ideal that exists outside of and superior to our social and political
concerns"); John E. Roemer, Equality and Responsibility, BOS. REV. (Apr./May
1995), http://new.bostonreview.net/BR20.2/roemer.html. For an earlier attempt to
reduce the dependence of important issues on controversial philosophical
assumptions, see John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical, 14
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 223, 223 (1985).
170. See Nicholas Barry, Defending Luck Egalitarianism, 23 J. APPLIED PHIL. 89,
98 (2006) ("If all citizens have equal moral worth, then there is something troubling
about allowing anybody to fall to an extreme level of material deprivation, when
others have sufficient resources to prevent this, even if the inequality is largely a
result of the victim's deliberate gambles."); Marc Fleurbaey, Freedom with
Forgiveness, 4 POL., PHIL. & ECON. 29 (2005) (addressing problems of perverse
incentives). See generally Peter Vallentyne, Brute Luck, Option Luck, and Equality
of Initial Opportunities, 112 ETHICS 529, 544-45 (2002) (discussing the pros and
cons of initial opportunity egalitarianism and "brute luck").
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practices allow various forms of voluntary and compulsory
insurance,171 bankruptcy options,"172 and even proximate cause
limitations on liability 1 3 to avoid personally disastrous outcomes.
Given these sorts of problems, it is not surprising that luck
egalitarianism comes in "weaker" and "stronger" versions,1 1 4 and
that the initially unitary, or at least manageable, idea of luck
egalitarianism inevitably fragments into a family of multiple
alternative options,1 all technically available to an as-yet-
unintimidated judge. The proliferation of arguably sensible but
quite distinct basic forms of egalitarianism thus continues.
171. For a helpful discussion of some major forms of contemporary American
social insurance programs, see THEODORE R. MARMOR, JERRY L. MASHAW & JOHN
PAKUTKA, SOCIAL INSURANCE: AMERICA'S NEGLECTED HERITAGE AND CONTESTED
FUTURE 1-68 (2014). For useful broad perspectives on insurance and the logic and
rationales thereof, see Kenneth Abraham, Four Conceptions of Insurance, 161 U.
PA. L. REV. 653, 657 (2013) ("[T]he governance conception views insurance as a
surrogate for government in ... protecting against misfortune .... "). For a concise
typology of governmental roles in insurance, see Richard Zeckhauser, Insurance, in
THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS 281 (David Henderson ed., 2d ed.
2007), http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Insurance.html. For discussion of the
relevance of attitudes toward risk, see Mark R. Greene, Attitudes Toward Risk and
a Theory of Insurance Consumption, 30 J. INS. 165 (1963).
172. For discussions of the role of bankruptcy and official forgiveness of
voluntarily incurred indebtedness, see Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy
in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1393 (1985) (discussing the legitimate role of
some official accommodation of regretted "impulse" and other forms of flawed
decision-making); Donald Korobkin, Contractarianism and the Normative
Foundations of Bankruptcy Law, 71 TEX. L. REV. 451 (1993) (critiquing normative
models of bankruptcy, including that set forth by Thomas Jackson); Katherine
Porter, The Damage of Debt, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 979 (2012) (discussing the
consequences of unmanageable indebtedness); Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy
Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775 (1987) ("I see bankruptcy as an attempt to reckon
with a debtor's multiple defaults and to distribute the consequences among a
number of different actors.").
173. Among the classic tort discussions, see In re Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d
708 (2d Cir. 1964); Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928); see also
Jane Stapleton, Legal Cause: Cause-in-Fact and the Scope of Liability for
Consequences, 54 VAND. L. REV. 941 (2001); Jeremy Waldron, Moments of
Carelessness and Massive Loss, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 387
(David G. Owen ed., 1997); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Foreseeability in Breach, Duty,
and Proximate Cause, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1247 (2009).
174. See Richard Arneson, Rethinking Luck Egalitarianism and Unacceptable
Inequalities, 40 PHIL. TOPICS 153, 154 (2012) (noting that, under strong luck
egalitarian views, the unfairness is "expunged if those who are worse off than
others are so through their own fault or choice," whereas, under weak luck
egalitarianism, "the injustice and unfairness of inequality are not entirely
expunged, but lessened, the more it is the case that those who are worse off than
others are so through their own fault or choice").
175. See, e.g., Richard J. Arneson, Luck Egalitarianism Interpreted and
Defended, 32 PHIL. TOPICS 1, 2 (2004) ("Luck egalitarianism as I conceive it is a
broad family of views arranged in four main variants.").
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Luck egalitarianism, rather than slicing through some of the
complications involved in thinking about equality, thus ends in
perpetuating and exacerbating some of the most basic
complications. In particular, luck egalitarianism does not dissolve
the choices among relatively stringent egalitarianism,
prioritarianism,"' and sufficientarianism. 1 h  Rather, luck
egalitarianism winds up highlighting the need to choose among
these fundamental alternatives, 17 9 as briefly depicted below.
V. Prioritarianism and Sufficientarianism as Further
Basic Alternatives to Stringent Egalitarianism
The final examples of the judicially unmanageable
complications of equality in this Article are among the most direct.
The basic idea is that we cannot reasonably say, without any
further analysis, that only the most stringent forms of
egalitarianism can count as forms of egalitarianism for
constitutional equal protection purposes. Consider the following
admittedly quite unrealistic hypothetical: Imagine that it is
possible to adopt a policy that improves the circumstances of a
small group of less well-off persons, perhaps temporarily and to
only a minimal degree, at a quite substantial permanent cost to a
much greater number of (relevantly innocent) persons at and just
above the society's median. We can certainly choose to view such a
policy as egalitarian-and as more egalitarian than not adopting
the particular policy. But does this mean that adopting the policy
is required by justice, fairness, or institutional morality? This
hypothetical is in itself again extreme and unrealistic. But a
number of related hypotheticals can be posed, the overall effect of
which may leave a reasonable judge wondering about the moral
and constitutional tradeoffs between a stringent egalitarianism,
however that may be defined, and other important progressive
values.
There is really no simple and attractive form of reasonably
stringent egalitarianism. There is, to begin with, room for debate
over which major theorists should count as stringent egalitarians.
176. See infra Part V.
177. See infra Part V.
178. See infra Part V.
179. See Knight, supra note 166, at 930 (presenting combinations of luck
egalitarianism and prioritarianism or luck egalitarianism and sufficientarianism as
viable options); Shlomi Segall, What's So Egalitarian About Luck Egalitarianism?,
28 RATIO 349, 351 (2015) (endorsing one version of luck egalitarianism over luck
prioritarianism and luck sufficientarianism).
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As possible candidates, consider the theorists G.A. Cohen1 ° and,
more controversially,181 John Rawls."2 And to assess the relative
merits of the various arguably stringent egalitarian views, a judge
would have to reach a conclusion, at least second hand, on
remarkably complex, highly speculative, and empirical matters,
1 3
including the minimum level of financial or other incentives really
required to motivate economic producers. 184
Suppose, then, that a judge is unwilling to commit to a
minimalist benefit to a deprived group at what seems a
disproportionate moral cost to other groups.1 85  What then? One
broad family of alternatives has been given the title of
"prioritarianism." Prioritarianism actually does not give an
utterly absolute priority to the interests of the less well off.16
Rather, prioritarianism counts each person's interests equally, but
gives some greater degree of moral weight to the interests of
persons who are desperate or ill-circumstanced, in some
180. See G.A. COHEN, RESCUING JUSTICE, supra note 164.
181. See, e.g., id. at 118 (focusing on Rawls's attention to the "basic structure" of
society as the crucial domain of equality); id at 116-77 (arguing that Rawls's
"Difference Principle," which maximizes the primary social goods available to the
least well off representative groups, is insufficiently egalitarian, particularly from
the standpoint of justice); R. George Wright, The High Cost of Rawls'
Inegalitarianism, 30 W. POL. Q. 73 (1977) [hereinafter Wright, The High Cost of
Rawls' Inegalitarianism]. For a critique of Cohen's response to Rawls, see Richard
J. Arneson, Justice Is Not Equality, in JUSTICE, EQUALITY AND CONSTRUCTIVISM:
ESSAYS ON G.A. COHEN'S RESCUING JUSTICE AND EQUALITY 5 (Brian Feltham ed.,
2009) [hereinafter Arneson, Justice Is Not Equality].
182. For a concise formulation nested within Rawlsian assumptions, see RAWLS,
A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 66, at 62 ("All social values-liberty and
opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect-are to be distributed
equally unless an unequal distribution of any, or all, of these values is to everyone's
advantage."). Whether Rawlsian principles are, in practice, more egalitarian than
the resource-focused egalitarianism of Ronald Dworkin is said by Dworkin himself
to depend in part on circumstances and empirical findings. See DWORKIN,
SOVEREIGN VIRTUE, supra note 137, at 115. For an exceptionally compressed
account of some basic resource-egalitarian principles, see RONALD DWORKIN,
JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 356-63 (2011).
183. See COHEN, RESCUING JUSTICE, supra note 164; Arneson, Justice Is Not
Equality, supra note 181; Wright, The High Cost of Rawls'Inegalitarianism, supra
note 181.
184. This is particularly true assuming a commitment to basic ideas of social
justice. See COHEN, RESCUING JUSTICE, supra note 164, at 48, 68-69, 85, 119.
185. For a concise rejection of the Rawlsian response to this sort of problem, see
NAGEL, supra note 157, at 73.
186. See Derek Parfit, Equality and Priority, 10 RATIO 202, 213 (1997)
[hereinafter Parfit, Equality and Priority]; see also Derek Parfit, Another Defense of
the Priority View, 24 UTILITAS 399, 401 (2012).
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supposedly absolute, non-comparative, or non-relative sense.187
Thus, for the prioritarian, ameliorating dreadful circumstances for
some persons could take moral priority over obtaining a greater
utility gain for a larger number of non-desperate persons."'
Prioritarians do not always maximize utility. 9 However, for the
prioritarian, it is also true that "benefits to the worse off could be
morally outweighed by sufficiently great benefits to the better
off,"1 90 so prioritarians also reject a Rawlsian absolute priority for
aiding the worst off.191 Just how much of a priority should be
accorded to the ill-circumstanced must somehow be worked out. 
19 2
It is again not this Article's intention to critique the
prioritarian approaches. The point is instead to note a few of the
inescapable basic complications. Let us simply assume that a
person's relevant "absolute" circumstances can be fully
disentangled from their "relative," or their essentially relational,
circumstances.1 9 3  Could it not seem reasonable in, say, an
educational equal protection case that the skill-set available to the
plaintiff students, as well as the value of that skill-set of teachers
relative to that of others in a competitive job marketplace, could
187. See Parfit, Equality and Priority, supra note 186, at 214. Parfit emphasizes
the supposedly absolute condition of the ill-circumstanced, rather than their
comparative status relative to others, in order to distinguish prioritarianism from
genuine (comparative) egalitarianism. On this point, see JOHN BROOME, WEIGHING
GOODS: EQUALITY, UNCERTAINTY AND TIME 198-99 (1995); Richard Norman,
Equality, Priority and Social Justice, 12 RATIO 178, 182-83 (1999); Michael Weber,
Prioritarianism, 9 PHIL. COMPASS 756, 757 (2014). A judge might choose to care
about both the absolute circumstances and the relative circumstances of the poor.
This approach might well lead to a refinement of the educational equality case San
Antonio Independent School District u. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). The logic of
combining these prioritarian and more purely egalitarian considerations is briefly
explored in SHELLY KAGAN, NORMATIVE ETHICS 54 (1998). However, a
constitutional judge might instead conclude that the idea of a person's absolute
circumstances, apart from any comparative or inherently relational element, is to
some degree misguided. See infra Part V.




192. For judges, the weight to be attached to being ill-circumstanced and to
supposedly absolute circumstances, as well as to relative or relational
circumstances, is likely to reflect inarticulate judicial intuitions. See R. George
Wright, The Role of Intuition in Judicial Decisionmaking, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1381,
1406-20 (2006).
193. But see infra Part VI (presenting reasons to doubt this possibility).
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both be legally relevant?19 4 If so, various judicial combinations of
prioritarianism and purer egalitarianism are available,195 by way
of yet further complication.
One final broad family of basic approaches may sometimes
have dramatically egalitarian consequences, but does not focus on
equality as a matter of principle. These approaches are known by
the usefully descriptive, if awkward, title of "sufficientarianism."
The most prominent forms of sufficientarianism, even more so
than prioritarianism,16 rely on the distinction between a person or
group's circumstances, absolutely understood, and their
circumstances relative to some other person or group. 97 On that
basis, the key intuition for sufficientarianism is that in many
cases, someone's "absolute" condition-e.g., starving, homeless, or
neither-is of greater moral importance than how they are faring
compared to some other person or group. 9
More directly put, the basic sufficientarian position is that
"[e]conomic equality is not, as such, of particular moral
importance. With respect to the distribution of economic assets,
what is important from the point of view of morality is not that
everyone should have the same but that each should have
enough."'99 The sufficientarian emphasis is thus not on "the fact
that some individuals.., have less money than others but [on] the
194. In this context, consider the Supreme Court's analysis in San Antonio
Independent School District u. Rodriguez. 411 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1973) (comparing
education resources across multiple school districts in Texas).
195. A judge could also add his or her particular views on luck, desert, choice, or
responsibility to a combination of prioritarianism and purer egalitarianism-or else
to a form of prioritarianism by itself. See Arneson, Justice Is Not Equality, supra
note 181, at 11; Knight, supra note 166, at 930.
196. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1; BROOME, supra note 187; KAGAN, supra note 187;
Norman, supra note 187; Parfit, Equality and Priority, supra note 186; Weber,
supra note 187.
197. See, e.g., SHER, EQUALITY FOR INEGALITARIANS, supra note 118, at vii
("[T]he non-comparative facts about a person's life are morally more important
than whether he fares better or worse than others."); Harry Frankfurt, The Moral
Irrelevance of Equality, 14 PUB. AFF. Q. 87, 91 (2000) ("What one person will
require in order to serve his own most authentic interests effectively does not
depend upon what another person has."). For an expression of skepticism on this
point, see Andrei Marmor, The Intrinsic Value of Economic Equality 1 (Jan. 31,
2000) (unpublished manuscript), ftp://meria.idc.ac.il/Pub/cources/law/marmor/
work/equality-htm ("[C] an it be the case that people have enough of what they need
if others have much more?... [N]eeds are also relative to the actual possessions of
others in the same society [above bare subsistence].").
198. This intuition does not work particularly well for high-end "positional
goods," including, say, houses with a breathtaking view of the Pacific and direct
access thereto. See FRED HIRSCH, SOCIAL LIMITS TO GROWTH 28 (1977).
199. Harry Frankfurt, Equality as a Moral Ideal, 98 ETHICS 21, 21 (1987)
[hereinafter Frankfurt, Equality as a Moral Ideal].
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fact that those with less have too little.,211 Of course, it would seem
a bit odd for a judge applying the Equal Protection Clause to look
primarily to a theory that downplays the moral significance of
equality, even if the theory may often lead to egalitarian effects.
But one available option, however much it would further
complicate matters for judges, is to somehow combine a form of
sufficientarianism with some form of (more stringent)
egalitarianism, to form a hybrid theory.21
In themselves, sufficientarian theories provide for ample
basic and unavoidable complications for the conscientious judge
deciding an issue of equal protection. Judges would have to
address the possibility that, for example, a sufficientarian might
unattractively recommend a policy by which a few persons are
moved from barely below sufficiency to just at or just above
sufficiency at a large cost to some unspecified number of persons
who are at all times well below2 2 the line of sufficiency.2 3  This
may seem regressive.
Even more basically, what counts as sufficiency in any given
context is not self-defining, or otherwise uncontroversially
discerned. In many cases, there will be a continuum from what
might be considered insufficient, to barely sufficient, to beyond
sufficient, with no distinctive markers along the way. In rare
204
cases, sufficiency may be set at a level of bare subsistence, or
200. Id. at 32; see HARRY G. FRANKFURT, ON EQUALITY (2015); see also Richard
W. Miller, Too Much Inequality, in SHOULD DIFFERENCES IN INCOME AND WEALTH
MATTER? 275, 280-81 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 2002) (emphasizing burdens
rather than inferiority).
201. For one step in such a direction, see the Compassion Principle articulated in
Roger Crisp, Equality, Priority, and Compassion, 113 ETHICS 745, 758 (2003) ("The
Compassion Principle: absolute priority is to be given to benefits to those below the
threshold at which compassion enters. Below the threshold, benefiting people
matters more the worse off those people are, the more of those people there are, and
the greater the size of the benefit in question. Above the threshold, or in cases
concerning only trivial benefits below the threshold, no priority is to be given.").
202. Under a luck egalitarian analysis, this may not be their fault. This group
could include people born with serious remediable or realistically irremediable
disabilities. Again, this is not to suggest that unavoidable tradeoffs among the
least well-off groups will be frequent or severe in practice; this hypothetical is
intended to serve as a test of principle.
203. For discussion of related hypotheticals, see Paula Casal, Why Sufficiency Is
Not Enough, 117 ETHICS 296, 298 (2007) (discussing Professor Frankfurt's
sufficientarianism); Liam Shields, The Prospects of Sufficientarianism, 24 UTILITAS
101, 101 (2012).
204. For context on a global minimum income, see VAN PARIJS, supra note 150,
at 3 ("I submit for discussion a proposal for the improvement of the human
condition: namely, that everyone should be paid a universal basic income (UBI), at
a level sufficient for subsistence.").
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even below the level of fulfillment of basic needs."' Particularly in
the most advanced economies, sufficiency may often seem more
readily associated with the unavoidably vague notion of
"decency.""2 6  Thus, it has been argued that in such societies,
justice does not require equality of resources,0 7 or of subjective
contentment,0 8 but of "the resources required for a decent level of
well-being."' 9
It would hardly be unreasonable, though, for a judge to
imagine that a state or federal constitutional right to education
should be set not at the level of "decency," let alone below decency,
but at some more elevated level of adequacy or equality.
Sufficientarianism offers to such a judge a number of basic options
and complications. Collectively, though, the sufficientarian
options in, say, public education, seem to merely reinscribe some,
if not all, of the options available to the Court in Rodriguez.
2 10
Sufficientarianism may tend, overall, to further proliferate
options, without itself providing much additional substantive
guidance for choosing one more or less complete slate of standards
over others.
In summary: individually, collectively, or in any creative
combination of these relatively pure forms of egalitarianism, the
various forms of prioritarianism, and the less directly
205. See id. at 6 ("A [universal basic income], as defined, can fall short of or
exceed what is regarded as necessary to a decent existence."). We set aside the
complication of sufficiency in cases of exceptionally expensive tastes, whether those
tastes are artificially cultivated or not.
206. See Stephen Nathanson, Equality, Sufficiency, Decency: Three Criteria of
Economic Justice, 30 J. PHIL. RES. 367, 371 (2005).
207. See id.
208. See id. ("Even if most people find modest levels of resources sufficient for
contentment, Frankfurt's theory makes sufficiency entirely person-relative and
thus totally dependent on the extent of someone's desires.").
209. Id.
210. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); see also supra
Part I (discussing Rodriguez). For relevant state cases, see Conn. Coal. for Justice
v. Rell, 990 A.2d 206 (Conn. 2010); King v. State, 818 N.W.2d 1, 33 (Iowa 2012);
Gannon v. State, 319 P.3d 1196 (Kan. 2014).
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egalitarian 211 family of sufficientarian views, tend more to
overwhelm than to generally guide or enlighten the conscientious
judge.
VI. Equality and the Lost Potential of Community,
Solidarity, and Fraternity
Let us briefly summarize more broadly: If a conscientious
judge sought to draw generally upon egalitarian theory, or any of
its major branches, in an attempt to inform and guide equal
protection jurisprudence, the attempt would quickly collapse
amidst basic, unavoidable, proliferating, unresolved complications.
Looking to the role of various forms of luck 212 or to diluted and
hybrid forms of egalitarianism 3  only adds further basic
complications without providing further meaningful guidance.
This state of affairs seems regrettable, and, in a way, it is
rather curious. Judges clearly need enough theory, of one sort or
another, to understand the idea of being equal, insofar as "equal"
bears upon "equal protection." Even the original drafters and
ratifiers of the Equal Protection Clause presumably did not
214dispense with their own dictionaries and thesauri.
211. It would be possible to treat the various forms of utilitarianism as
approaches to a weak form of egalitarianism. Utilitarianism, in order to be
meaningful, requires a remarkable degree of specification. See David Lyons, The
Moral Opacity of Utilitarianism (Bos. Univ. Sch. of L. Working Paper Series, Paper
No. 99-7, 1999), http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf~abstract id=212288. Utilitarian-
ism does classically treat each person as one, and no one as more than one. See,
e.g., Berlin, supra note 94, at 301. But given utilitarianism's typical indifference to
the distribution of utility among persons, it seems sensible to set utilitarianism
aside. See HIROSE, supra note 77, at 4 ("Classical utilitarianism endorses assigning
equal weight to every person's well-being .... However, it is not concerned with
how people's well-being is distributed."). Note that any egalitarian effects of the
diminishing marginal utility of income may be offset by phenomena such as loss
aversion, endowment effects, and status quo biases. See Daniel Kahneman, Jack L.
Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status
Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193 (1991). For a more critical stance, see David Gal,
A Psychological Law of Inertia and the Illusion of Loss Aversion, 1 JUDGMENT &
DECISION MAKING 23 (2006).
212. See supra Part IV.
213. See supra Part V.
214. The original version of the thesaurus compiled by Peter Mark Roget
predates the Civil War. See WERNER HULLEN, A HISTORY OF ROGET'S THESAURUS:




In the abstract, ideas such as community, solidarity, and
(arguably) gender-neutral215 fraternity 16 might provide guidance in
addressing questions of equality and inequality. The key problem,
however, is that the Constitution and its interpreters have never
generally recognized community, solidarity, or fraternity as
remotely analogous in their significance, weight, or stature to
either liberty or to individual and group equality.27
One might also argue that ideas of community, solidarity,
and fraternity are as fundamentally indeterminate and conflicting
as that of equality. If so, such ideas would likely be unavailable or
of only modest use in interpreting equal protection. This may well
be. The point here, though, is that even if the ideas involved were
nicely determinate, community and related ideas typically lack the
constitutional stature to significantly refine our thinking about
equal protection.
One problem in this respect is that community, solidarity,
and fraternity have an essentially collective dimension that
equality is sometimes claimed to lack. Equality is sometimes
thought of in individualistic-as distinct from group-focused-
terms.1 Community, solidarity, and fraternity may require not
only that the better-off sincerely cheer for the less well-off, but
that the less well-off cheer for the better-off when they quite
215. See SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX 766 (Constance Borde & Sheila
Malovany-Chevallier trans., Alfred A. Knopf 2011) (1949) (stating that, for the sake
of a higher form of freedom, "men and women must ... unequivocally affirm their
brotherhood.").
216. For background theory on the meanings of these and related concepts, see
generally SEBASTIAN DE GRAZIA, THE POLITICAL COMMUNITY (3d ed. 1966) (urging
for the revival of the political community and the study of anomie, which is the
study of the ideological factors that negatively affect the allegiances of a political
community); ROBERT A. NISBET, THE QUEST FOR COMMUNITY (reprt. 1969)
(focusing on the political causes of the loss of community in the United States);
ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN
COMMUNITY (2000) (reviewing trends in social capital and community and civic
engagement in the United States). For a sense of the alternative French
Revolutionary triad of liberty, equality, and fraternity, see, for example, MARQUIS
DE CONDORCET, THE SKETCH FOR A HISTORICAL PICTURE OF THE PROGRESS OF THE
HUMAN MIND (1795), reprinted in POLITICAL WRITINGS 1, 100 (Steven Lukes &
Nadia Urbinati eds., 2012) (referring in particular to "the brotherhood of man").
217. For a discussion in the specific context of homelessness policy, see Wright,
Homelessness, supra note 24; see also Frankfurt, Equality as a Moral Ideal, supra
note 199, at 24 n.6 (assuming that equality is largely a matter of comparing
individuals and their circumstances and that fraternity is less salient than liberty
or equality because of our basic commitment to individualism, onto which the non-
individualist idea of fraternity maps poorly).
218. See, e.g., TEMKIN, INEQUALITY, supra note 142, at 285 ("[W]hat we have is a
concern for the individuals who compose society and its groups. Equality, like
many other ideals, should be understood individualistically, not holistically.").
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legitimately succeed. 219 Or equality may be thought of as merely a
sort of thin, bloodless, remote, detached friendship.2 Or, at the
further extreme, one could actually more or less identify equality
with fraternity itself221
Many egalitarians, though, have raised the possibility that
equality, even if it is valuable in itself, can also be pursued
precisely for the sake of community, solidarity, or fraternity. 22 If
equality is to be pursued in part for the sake of fraternity and
related values, perhaps judicial interpretations of equal protection
should to some degree be guided by visions of fraternity.
There is certainly some logic to interpreting equality and
equal protection in light of the values of community, solidarity,
and fraternity. The human need for meaningful belonging 3
typically requires some degree of equality, and of commonality of
experience. Many people appreciate the opportunity to be a
genuinely valued contributing member of a team. 24 And where
219. See Geoffrey Cupit, Fraternity and Equality, 88 PHIL. 299, 307 (2013).
220. See Andrea Teuber, Simone Weil: Equality as Compassion, 43 PHIL. &
PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 221, 224 (1982) (reflecting on the thinking of Simone
Weil).
221. See William Morris, The Lesser Arts (1877), reprinted in NEWS FROM
NOWHERE AND OTHER WRITINGS 231, 253 (Clive Wilmer ed., 1993) ("EQUALITY,
which, and which only, means FRATERNITY.").
222. See, e.g., COHEN, RESCUING JUSTICE, supra note 164, at 32 n.9 (stating that
community is now less compatible with inequalities than in premarket societies);
JEAN HAMPTON, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 154 (1997) (discussing Aristotle's view that
equality of means produces the right kind of friendships or partnerships among the
citizenry); DAVID HOLLENBACH, THE COMMON GOOD AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS 202
(2002) ("Poor people who are unemployed, inadequately housed, and undereducated
in American inner cities are not part of a society that can be called a
commonwealth."); Anderson, supra note 152, at 288-89 (stating that the proper aim
of egalitarianism "is not to ensure that everyone gets what they morally deserve,
but to create a community in which people stand in relations of equality to
others."); Frankfurt, Equality as a Moral Ideal, supra note 199, at 24 ("Sometimes
it is urged that the prevalence of fraternal relationships among the members of a
society is a desirable goal and that equality is indispensable to it."); Thomas Nagel,
The Justification of Equality, 10 CRITICA: REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE
FILOSOFIA 3, 5 (1978) (stating that, from a non-individualist, communitarian view,
"equality is good for a society taken as a whole"); Scanlon, supra note 130, at 19
("The aim of avoiding stigmatizing differences in status appeals to an ideal of
fraternity that is fundamentally egalitarian, and has been central to the egalitarian
tradition.").
223. See generally MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE NEEDS OF STRANGERS 13-14 (1985)
("It is because fraternity, love, belonging, dignity and respect cannot be specified as
rights that we ought to specify them as needs and seek ... to make their
satisfaction a routine human practice.").
224. See Lawrence Crocker, Equality, Solidarity, and Rawls'Maximin, 6 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 262, 263 (1977) ("People like the feeling of being part of a team where all
members sink or rise together and equally.").
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there is genuine community, solidarity, and fraternity, the
remaining non-exploitive inequalities among persons tend not to
distract and destabilize the society.
225
But, even so, given our historic constitutional emphasis on
rights-and in particular on the rights of individuals and of
discrete groups-the discourse of community, solidarity, and
fraternity, however reasonably defined, cannot typically carry the
authoritative weight necessary to generally guide and constrain
the judicial interpretation of equal protection.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court has thus not typically availed itself of the
most conspicuous historical or contemporary theories of equality in
interpreting and applying the Equal Protection Clause. This
curious state of affairs is regrettable, regardless of one's general
theory of constitutional interpretation. In large measure, this
general disconnect is attributable to the endlessly proliferating
and ultimately bewildering complications in even the most basic
approaches to equality.
One might argue, perhaps, that this lack of useful general
guidance from theories of equality is of less practical import than
might be imagined. After all, the Court does not, on any occasion,
adjudicate alleged denial of equality, or of equal protection, merely
in general. Equal protection cases instead focus more contextually
on economics and opportunity,226 or on questions involving, as we
225. See R.H. TAWNEY, EQUALITY 113 (Unwin Books 5th ed. 1964) (1931)
(arguing that group exclusion, at the cost of human fellowship, is objectionable in
ways not characteristic of mere "counting-house" inequalities among those who are
in genuine community).
226. For a sampling of some popular, broadly economic policy-oriented references
to problems of inequality, see, for example, ANTHONY B. ATKINSON, INEQUALITY:
WHAT CAN BE DONE? 303 (2015) (recommending "guaranteed public employment at
the minimum wage to those who seek it" and arguing that "there should be a
statutory minimum wage set at a living wage, and.., a capital endowment
(minimum inheritance) paid to all at adulthood"); THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 1-39 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., Harvard Univ. Press
2014) (2013) (arguing that a general inverse relationship exists between the rate of
economic growth and the concentration of accumulated wealth); STIGLITZ, THE
GREAT DIVIDE, supra note 38, at 141 ("[A] young person's life prospects are in
America more dependent on the income and education of his parents than in almost
any other advanced country."); Tammy Harel Ben-Shahar, Equality in Education-
Why We Must Go All the Way, ETHICAL THEORY & MORAL PRAC. 1 (Apr. 12, 2015),
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10677-015-9587-3 ("[J]ustice in education
requires nothing short of equal educational outcome between all individual
students."); Warren Buffett, Opinion, Better Than Raising the Minimum Wage,
WALL STREET J. (May 21, 2015, 7:12 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/better-than-
raising-the-minimum-wage-1432249927 (arguing for a major expansion of the
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have seen, matters of race and ethnicity, alienage, sex and sexual
orientation, disability, and other statuses, along with their
interactive effects. 227  Equal protection cases are thus focused on
distinct categories, classifications, and contexts, 28 whatever their
complications.
Differences among the particular kinds of equal protection
cases are no doubt apparent to all of us. The problem, though, is
that no particular categorical or contextualized theory can point
Earned Income Tax Credit); Tyler Cowen, It's Not the Inequality; It's the
Immobility, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2015), www.nytimes.com/2015/04/05upshot/its-not-
the-inequality-its-the-immobility.html ("Finding ways to increase economic
mobility should be our greater concern."); Glenn Hubbard, Opinion, Tax Reform Is
the Best Way to Tackle Income Inequality, WASH. POST (Jan. 10, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/tax-reform-is-the-best-way-to-tackle-inco
me-inequality/2014/01/10/112710ea-68ca-1le3-a0b9-249bbb34602c story.html ("A
policy shift in favor of mass prosperity-dynamism and inclusion-is best
conducted via fundamental tax reform."); Neil Irwin, Why Americans Don't Want to
Soak the Rich, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/19/
upshot/why-americans-don't-want-to-soak-the-rich.html (citing studies to
demonstrate the complexity of Americans' attitudes about redistribution of wealth);
Neil Irwin, Why More Education Won't Fix Economic Inequality, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
31, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/01/upshot/why-more-education-won't-
fix-economic-inequality.html? (discussing a study that found that increased
education improved economic potential, but it did not address the wealth gap);
Steven Quartz & Anette Asp, Opinion, Unequal, Yet Happy, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/12/opinion/sunday/unequal-yet-happy.html
("[O]ur current Gilded Age has been greeted with relative complacency."); Greatest
Dangers in the World, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Oct. 16, 2014),
www.pewglobal.org/2014/10/16/greatest-dangers-in-the-world/ (finding that
"Europeans and Americans Focus on Inequality as Greatest Danger"); Raj Chetty
et al., Uhere Is the Land of Opportunity? The Geography of Intergenerational
Mobility in the United States (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
19843, 2014), http://www.nber.org/papers/w19843 (finding overall recent stability
in U.S. economic mobility despite increased income inequality, but limited
intergenerational mobility in parts of the Southeast and Rust Belt); Vladimir
Gimpelson & Daniel Treisman, Misperceiving Inequality (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 21174, 2015), http://www.nber.org/papers/s21174
(finding perceived, but not actual, levels of inequality as correlated with the
demand for redistribution); Robert J. Gordon, Is U.S. Economic Growth Over?
Faltering Innovation Confronts the Six Headwinds (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 18315, 2012), http://www.nber.org/papers/w18315 (positing that
the rapid economic progress of the United States is unique and will not continue
indefinitely); Charles I. Jones, The Facts of Economic Growth (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21142, 2015) (manuscript at 32-34),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w21142 (summarizing some recent international
economic inequality data). For a general economic focus, but with explicit attention
to several conspicuous social categories of domination and oppression, see the
collection entitled Equality and Public Policy, in 31 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y (2015).
227. See supra Part I.
228. See WALZER, supra note 152; YOUNG, supra note 152; Anderson, supra note
152; Scheffler, supra note 152; see also JOHN WILSON, EQUALITY 21 (1966)




out just which cross-categorical differences are relevant, how they
are relevant, how much they matter, and, in addition, how to
accommodate interactive effects that may perhaps be reinforcing
or synergistic."' In all such cases, the potential value of some
legitimate broader theory of equality, adaptable for realistic use by
judges, remains.
229. For background discussion, see Larry S. Temkin, Inequality: A Complex,
Individualistic, and Comparative Notion, 11 PHIL. ISSUES 327, 337 (2011).
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Appendix: Some Historical Illustrations
What follows is a highly selective chronological listing of
works that positively address the grounds, nature, or measure of
some form of equality relevant to the arguments above. On this
understanding, see:
MozI, BASIC WRITINGS 43 (Burton Watson trans., Columbia Univ.
Press 2003) (c. 400 B.C.E.) (endorsing the universality, rather
than the partiality, of one's benevolence).
PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 227 (Francis M. Cornford trans., Oxford
Univ. Press 1951) (c. 360 B.C.E.) ("[T]he soul of every man does
possess the power of learning the truth and the organ to see it
with.").
ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE 130 (Ernest Barker trans.,
Oxford Univ. Press 1962) (c. 330 B.C.E.) ("[A] man who is
superior to others in flute-playing, but far inferior in birth and
beauty... ought to get the better supply of flutes.").
MENCIUS, MENCIUS 247 (D.C. Lau trans., Chinese Univ. Press
2003) (c. 310 B.C.E.) ("As far as what is genuinely in him is
concerned, a man is capable of becoming good....").
THE BHAGAVAD GITA 43 (W.J. Johnson trans., Oxford Univ. Press
1994) (c. 300 B.C.E.) ("I am the same with regard to all
creatures; I feel neither aversion nor affection. But whoever
shares in me with devotion, may be thought of as good, for he
has fixed on what is right.").
EPICTETUS, THE DISCOURSES 24-25 (Christopher Gill ed., Robin
Hard rev. trans., Everyman 1995) (c. 140) (discussing the
question "what should we conclude from the doctrine of our
kinship to God?").
JOHN CHRYSOSTOM, ON WEALTH AND POVERTY 55 (Catherine P.
Roth trans., St. Vladimir Seminary Press 1981) (c. 390) ("[N]ot to
share our own wealth with the poor is theft from the poor .... ).
PETER ABELARD, ETHICS, reprinted in ETHICAL WRITINGS 1, 21
(Paul Vincent Spade trans., 1995) (c. 1140) ("If... the possession
of things cannot bring about a better soul, surely it cannot make
it dearer to God .... ).
MOSES MAIMONIDES, Guide of the Perplexed, reprinted in ETHICAL
WRITINGS OF MAIMONIDES 129, 131 (Raymond L. Weiss &
Charles Butterworth trans., 1975) (c. 1190) (discussing the
divine image in persons, who are little lower than the angels).
BONAVENTURE, THE LIFE OF ST. FRANCIS, reprinted in
BONAVENTURE 179, 254 (Ewert Cousins trans., 1978) (c. 1260)
("Francis said: 'I believe that the great Almsgiver will charge me
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with theft if I do not give what I have to one who needs it
more."').
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, THE SUMMA OF THEOLOGY, reprinted in ST.
THOMAS AQUINAS ON POLITICS AND ETHICS 30, 72 (Paul Sigmund
ed. & trans., 1988) (c. 1270) ("[T]he things that anyone has in
superabundance ought [not just morally, but legally] to be used
to support the poor.").
MEISTER ECKHART, No Respecter of Persons (Sermon 17), in
MEISTER ECKHART: A MODERN TRANSLATION 174, 177 (Raymond
Bernard Blakney trans., 1941) (c. 1320) ("[H]umanity is just as
perfect in the poorest, most despised person as it is in the Pope
or the emperor.").
BIRGITTA OF SWEDEN, THE FIFTH BOOK OF REVELATIONS, reprinted
in BIRGITTA OF SWEDEN: LIFE AND SELECTED REVELATIONS 101,
111 (Marguerite Tjader Harris ed., Albert Ryle Kezel trans.,
1990) (c. 1350) ("[A]ll temporal goods ought to be common and,
out of charity, equal for those in need.").
GIOVANNI PICO DELLA MIRANDOLA, On the Dignity of Man, in ON
THE DIGNITY OF MAN 1, 5 (Charles Glenn Wallis trans., Hackett
Publ'g Co., reprt. 1998) (1486) ("Thou... mayest sculpt thyself
into whatever shape thou dost prefer.").
THOMAS MORE, UTOPIA 84 (Robert M. Adams ed. & trans., W.W.
Norton & Co. 2d ed. 1992) (1516) ("My chief objection was to the
basis of their whole system, that is, their communal living and
their moneyless economy.").
ST. TERESA OF AVILA, THE LIFE OF TERESA OF JESUS 201 (E. Allison
Peers trans., Image Books 1960) (1565) ("How friendly we should
all be with one another if nobody were interested in money and
honour!").
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE 97-99 (Barbara
A. Mowat & Paul Werstine eds., Simon & Schuster Paperbacks
2010) (c. 1600) ("Hath not a Jew eyes? Hath not a Jew hands,
organs, dimensions, senses, affections, passions? Fed with the
same food, hurt with the same weapons, subject to the same
diseases, healed by the same means, warmed and cooled by the
same winter and summer, as a Christian is? If you prick us, do
we not bleed? If you tickle us, do we not laugh? If you poison us,
do we not die?").
TOMMASO CAMPANELLA, THE CITY OF THE SUN: A POETICAL
DIALOGUE 39 (Daniel J. Donno trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 1981)
(1602), ("[T]hey cannot give gifts to one another because all is
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held in common and because the officials are careful to see that
no one has more than he deserves, while everyone has all that he
needs.").
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR 162 (J.S. Bratton ed., Bristol
Classical Press 1987) (c. 1606) ("So distribution should undo
excess, And each man have enough.").
THE ENGLISH LEVELLERS (Andrew Sharp ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1998) (c. 1648).
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 87 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1996) (1651) ("[T]he difference between man, and
man, is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon
claim to himself[] any benefit, to which another may not pretend,
as well as he.").
BENEDICT DE SPINOZA, THEOLOGICAL-POLITICAL TREATISE 195
(Jonathan Israel ed., Michael Silverthorne & Jonathan Israel
trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2007) (1670) ("[E]ach individual
thing has the sovereign right to do everything that it can
do .... ").
RICHARD CUMBERLAND, A Philosophical Inquiry into the Laws of
Nature, in A TREATISE OF THE LAWS OF NATURE 237, 371 (Jon
Parkin ed., John Maxwell trans., Liberty Fund, Inc. 2005) (1672)
("[The human mind has a] spiritual, incorporeal, and God-like
Nature, which is capable of a better Employment than that of
the Soul of a Swine, instead of Salt, to preserve a Carcass from
Rottenness .... ).
SAMUEL PUFENDORF, ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN
ACCORDING TO NATURAL LAW 61 (James Tully ed., Michael
Silverthorne trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1673)
("[E]ach man [should] value and treat the other as naturally his
equal, or as equally a man.").
JOHN LOCKE, The Second Treatise of Government, in TWO
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 285, 289 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (1690) (stating that humans are
equal because they are "all the Workmanship of one Omnipotent
and infinitely wise Maker; All the Servants of one Sovereign
Master.... [and] his Property .... "); BLAISE PASCAL, Pensje
200, in PENStES 66, 66 (A.J. Krailsheimer trans., Penguin Books
rev. ed. 1995) (1670) ("[E]ven if the universe were to crush him,
man would still be nobler than his slayer, because he knows that
he is dying . . ").
MONTESQUIEU, Letter 109, in PERSIAN LETTERS 150, 150-51
(Margaret Mauldon trans., Oxford World Classics 2008) (1721)
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(naming equality as the source of the collective wealth of the
citizenry).
ALEXANDER POPE, AN ESSAY ON MAN (1733-1734), reprinted in
THE RAPE OF THE LOCK AND OTHER POEMS 85, 115 (Martin Price
ed., 2003) ("Thus God and Nature linked the general frame, And
bade Self-love and Social be the same.").
JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, A DISCOURSE ON INEQUALITY 137
(Maurice Cranston trans., Penguin Books 1984) (1755) ("[I]t is
manifestly contrary to the law of nature.., that a handful of
people should gorge themselves with superfluities while the
hungry multitude goes in want of necessities.").
ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 345
(Prometheus Books 2000) (1759) ("The meanest as well as the
greatest, are under the immediate care and protection of that
great, benevolent, and all-wise Being .... ").
JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, The Social Contract, in THE SOCIAL
CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES 1, 50 (G.D.H. Cole trans., E.P.
Dutton & Co. 1950) (1762) ("[N]o citizen shall ever be wealthy
enough to buy another, and none poor enough to be forced to sell
himself. .. ").
VOLTAIRE, E1 galitj (Equality), in PHILOSOPHICAL DICTIONARY 245,
245 (Peter Gay trans., Basic Books, Inc. 1962) (1764) ("[A]ll men
would necessarily be equal, if they were without needs.... [I]t is
not inequality which is the real evil, it is dependence.").
DENIS DIDEROT, Suppliment au Voyage de Bougainville (1772),
reprinted in POLITICAL WRITINGS 35, 42 (John Hope Mason &
Robert Wokler eds. & trans., 1992) ("This inhabitant of Tahiti,
whom you wish to ensnare like an animal, is your brother. You
are both children of Nature. What right do you have over him
that he does not have over you?").
JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION
44-45 (Prometheus Books 1988) (1781) (noting how persons
might react differently to similar pain and pleasure stimuli).
MARQUIS DE CONDORCET, ON THE INFLUENCE OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION IN EUROPE (1786), reprinted in CONDORCET:
SELECTED WRITINGS 71, 73 (Keith M. Baker ed., 1976) (referring
to "the natural and primitive equality of man").
THOMAS PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN 38 (Heritage Press 1961) (1791)
("The illuminating and divine principle of the equal rights of
man (for it has its origin from the Maker of man) relates, not
only to the living individuals, but to generations of men
succeeding each other.").
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MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT, A VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS OF WOMAN
(Candace Ward ed., Dover Publ'ns, Inc. 1996) (1792) (arguing
that deficiencies in education, rather than innate intellectual
differences, account for the inequality between men and women).
FRIEDRICH SCHILLER, Twenty-Seventh Letter, in ON THE AESTHETIC
EDUCATION OF MAN 131, 140 (Reginald Snell trans., Dover
Publ'ns, Inc. 2012) (1795) (referring to a preparatory phase
where, "in the realm of aesthetic appearance, is fulfilled the
ideal of equality which the visionary would fain see realized in
actuality also .... ).
IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 30 (Mary Gregor
ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (1797) ("Innate
equality [is] independence from being bound by others to more
than one can in turn bind them .... ).
WILLIAM GODWIN, Principles of Society, in ENQUIRY CONCERNING
POLITICAL JUSTICE 67, 78 (K. Codell Carter ed., Oxford Univ.
Press 1971) (1798) ("[W]e may deduce the moral equality of
mankind. We are partakers of a common nature, and the same
causes that contribute to the benefit of one, will contribute to the
benefit of another.").
ROBERT OWEN, THE MANIFESTO OF ROBERT OWEN (1840), reprinted
in A NEW VIEW OF SOCIETY AND OTHER WRITINGS 360, 360-63
(Gregory Claeys ed., 1991) (claiming that private property
creates "inequality of condition").
PIERRE-JOSEPH PROUDHON, WHAT IS PROPERTY? 168 (Donald R.
Kelley & Bonnie G. Smith eds. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press
1994) (1840) ("Property is impossible because it is the negation
of equality.").
SOREN KIERKEGAARD, WORKS OF LOVE: SOME CHRISTIAN
REFLECTIONS IN THE FORM OF DISCOURSES 70, 72 (Howard Hong
& Edna Hong trans., Harper & Bros. 1962) (1847) ("One's
neighbour is one's equal.").
ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER, ON LAW AND POLITICS, reprinted in
ESSAYS AND APHORISMS 148, 148 (R.J. Hollingdale trans., 1970)
(1851) ("[I]n each man the same will to live appears at the same
stage of its objectivization.").
HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY DICK 126 (Penguin Books 1992) (1851)
("[T]hat democratic dignity which, on all hands, radiates without
end from God; Himself!").
CHARLES DICKENS, A TALE OF TWO CITIES 122 (Signet Classics




WALT WHITMAN, Thoughts, in LEAVES OF GRASS 408, 410 (Jason
Stacy ed., Univ. of Iowa Press 2009) (1860) ("Of Equality-As if
it harmed me, giving others the same chances and rights as
myself . ... ).
VICTOR HUGO, LES MIStRABLES 575 (Lee Fahnestock & Norman
MacAfee trans., Signet Classics 1987) (1862) (describing the
Paris street urchin).
JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (1863), reprinted in ON
LIBERTY, UTILITARIANISM AND OTHER ESSAYS 115, 145 (Mark
Philp & Frederick Rosen eds., 2015) ("Society between equals
can only exist on the understanding that the interests of all are
to be regarded equally").
MATTHEW ARNOLD, CULTURE AND ANARCHY 70 (J. Dover Wilson
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (1869) ("[Culture] seeks to do
away with classes ....
FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, Schopenhauer as Educator, in UNTIMELY
MEDITATIONS 127, 127 (Daniel Breazeale ed., R.J. Hollingdale
trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1997) (1874) ("[E]very man
knows.., he will be in the world only once and that no
imaginable chance will for a second time gather together into a
unity so strangely variegated an assortment as he is. . .
WILLIAM MORRIS, The Lesser Arts (1877), reprinted in NEWS FROM
NOWHERE AND OTHER WRITINGS 231, 253 (Clive Wilmer ed.,
1993) ("[W]e shall one day achieve equality, which, and which
only, means fraternity, and so have leisure from poverty and all
its griping, sordid cares.").
EDWARD BELLAMY, LOOKING BACKWARD 87 (Cecilia Tichi ed.,
Penguin Classics 1986) (1888) ("The basis of his claim [to an
equal economic share] is that he is a man!").
KARL MARX, Critique of the Gotha Program (1891), reprinted in
THE MARX-ENGELS READER 525, 531 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 2d
ed. 1978) ("In a higher phase of communist society.., can the
narrow horizon of bourgeois right be crossed ... and society
inscribe on its banners: From each according to his ability, to
each according to his needs!").
Frederick Douglass, Self-Made Men (Apr. 6, 1894), in GREAT
SPEECHES BY FREDERICK DOUGLASS 125, 148 (James Daley ed.,
2013) ("[O]ur national genius welcomes humanity from every
quarter and grants to all an equal chance in the race of life.").
LEO TOLSTOY, THE KINGDOM OF GOD IS WITHIN You 373 (Leo
Wiener trans., Noonday Press 1961) (1894) ("[O]nly with the
recognition of the equality of all men, with their mutual service,
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is possible the realization of the greatest good which is accessible
to men .... ).
THOMAS HARDY, JUDE THE OBSCURE 73 (Wordsworth Editions Ltd.
1993) (1895) (discussing the closed cultural circumstances of the
young and educationally aspiring stone mason Jude Fawley).
William Dean Howells, Equality as the Basis of Good Society, 51
CENTURY MAG. 63, 63 (1895) ("The ideal of society is equality,
because ... to all in their more enlightened moments, inequality
is irksome and offensive.").
WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 355
(Modern Library 1994) (1902) ("[T]he mystery of democracy, or
sentiment of the equality before God of all his
creatures ... tends to nullify man's usual acquisitiveness.").
W.E.B. Du BOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK (Dover Publ'ns., Inc.
1994) (1903) (addressing the continuing oppression of Black
Americans).
JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION 117-18 (Free Press
reprint ed. 1997) (1916) (discussing the origin of the "following
nature" education doctrine).
George Bernard Shaw, Socialism: Principles and Outlook, in 3
THE ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 572, 572 (J.L. Garvin ed., 13th
ed. 1926) ("Socialism, reduced to its simplest legal and practical
expression, means the complete discarding of the institution of
private property by transforming it into public property, and the
division of the resultant public income equally and
indiscriminately among the entire population.").
R.H. TAWNEY, EQUALITY (Unwin Books 5th ed. 1964) (1931)
(arguing for a more equal English society).
SIMONE WEIL, THE NEED FOR ROOTS: PRELUDE TO A DECLARATION
OF DUTIES TOWARDS MANKIND 15 (Arthur Wills trans., Routledge
2002) (1949) ("Equality is a vital need of the human
soul.... [T]he same amount of respect and consideration is due
to every human being because this respect is due to the human
being as such and is not a matter of degree.").
SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX (Constance Borde & Sheila
Malovany-Chevallier trans., Alfred A. Knopf 2011) (1949)
(examining the history of women's oppression).
MICHAEL YOUNG, THE RISE OF THE MERITOCRACY (Transaction
Publishers 1994) (1958) (presenting a satire of the United
Kingdom's education system).
ARNOLD BRECHT, POLITICAL THEORY: THE FOUNDATIONS OF
TWENTIETH-CENTURY POLITICAL THOUGHT 311 (1959) ("One
significant feature in which all human beings are alike may be
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their ability to choose to be good or evil in any moment of their
lives.").
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., STRENGTH TO LOVE 69 (Fortress Press
2010) (1963) ("All men are caught in an inescapable network of
mutuality, tied in a single garment of destiny.... I can never be
what I ought to be until you are what you ought to be, and you
can never be what you ought to be until I am what I ought to
be.").
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., Negroes Are Not Moving Too Fast
(1964), reprinted in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL
WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 176, 176
(James Melvin Washington ed., 1986) (referencing the Anatole
France dictum that "[t]he law, in its majestic equality, forbids all
men to sleep under bridges-the rich as well as the poor").
JUDITH N. SHKLAR, THE FACES OF INJUSTICE 115 (1990) (arguing
that genuine consent requires that it be "possible for the most
deprived members of society to speak without fear and with
adequate information").
IRIS MURDOCH, METAPHYSICS AS A GUIDE TO MORALS 365 (1992)
("Human beings are valuable, not because they are created by
God or because they are rational beings or good citizens, but
because they are human beings.").
J1iRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS
TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 166-67
(William Rehg trans., 1996) (1992) ("[N]on-neutralizable
bargaining power should at least be disciplined by its equal
distribution among the parties. More specifically, the
negotiation of compromises should follow procedures ... [such]
that all the affected interests ... have equal chances of
prevailing. To the extent that these conditions are met, there
are grounds for presuming that negotiated agreements are
fair.").
JOHN E. COONS & PATRICK M. BRENNAN, BY NATURE EQUAL: THE
ANATOMY OF A WESTERN INSIGHT 148-63 (1999) (discussing
equality in Christian philosophy).
J1iRGEN HABERMAS, THE FUTURE OF HUMAN NATURE 56 (Hella
Beister, Max Pensky & William Rehg trans., 2003) (2001) ("On
the one hand, there is the nature of the person 'being an end in
itself who as an inexchangeable individual is supposed to be
capable of leading a life of his own; on the other hand, there is
the equal respect which every person in his quality as a person is
entitled to.").
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NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, JUSTICE: RIGHTS AND WRONGS 360
(2008) ("[I]f God loves, in the mode of attachment, each and
every human being equally and permanently, then natural
human rights inhere in the worth bestowed on human beings by
that love.").
GILBERT MEILAENDER, NEITHER BEAST NOR GOD: THE DIGNITY OF
THE HUMAN PERSON 87-104 (2009) (discussing the idea of equal
dignity of all persons).
JEAN PORTER, MINISTERS OF THE LAW: A NATURAL LAW THEORY OF
LEGAL AUTHORITY 337 (2010) ("[W]ith respect to the
fundamental needs and capabilities proper to us as organisms of
a certain kind, we are all equal . . ").
GEORGE KATEB, HUMAN DIGNITY 17 (2011) ("Only the human
species is, in the most important existential respects, a break
with nature and significantly not natural .... Of course, if the
species breaks with nature, so must every individual member of
it.").
RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 2 (2011) ("[Any
legitimate government] must show equal concern for the fate of
every person over whom it claims dominion [and] must respect
fully the responsibility and right of each person to decide for
himself how to make something valuable of his life.").
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